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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS  
DEFINING ĪŚVARA: A NEW PERSPECTIVE IN THE HERMENEUTICS OF 
CLASSICAL YOGA 
by 
Daniella Vaclavik 
Florida International University, 2013 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Nathan Katz, Major Professor 
The mere presence of the term īśvara in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra has come to affect the 
meaning of both the path and the goal of Classical Yoga as well as the meaning of the 
term Yoga itself. The frequent translation of the term īśvara as God leads to the system of 
Classical Yoga to be labeled as theistic, particularly obscuring the interpretation of 
īśvarapraṇidhāna, a functional component of the system, as well as perpetuating a 
syncretic trend that has led to the popular understanding of Yoga as ‘union with the 
divine’. From identifying problematic hermeneutical trends and their underlying causes, 
as well as understanding the term within the constraints of the original text in its original 
Sanskrit, the term īśvara emerges as the archetype of an ultimate reality functioning as a 
practical and experiential tool providing the yogi with a direct glimpse of its true nature. 
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PREFACE 
 
 
 Since I began my journey into Yoga I have been extremely lucky to have been 
exposed to highly qualified and exemplary teachers, yet I noticed many of my teachers 
would use conflicting ideologies as support arguments for their positions, thus attempting 
to reconcile Classical Yoga with several other ideologies. The most intriguing statement 
came from my Yoga Guru, Śrī K. Pattabhi Jois,1 or ‘Guruji’, as students affectionately 
address him.  When describing his lineage of Aṣṭaṅga Yoga he would say: “Aṣṭaṅga 
Yoga is Patañjali Yoga”. Since I had been studying the text for some time, I had a 
particular understanding of what that entailed. To me, it meant he adhered to the 
philosophy Patañjali followed, mainly, a dualistic model, quite contrary from that of 
Advaita Vedanta or Bhakti Yoga. Furthermore, when asked by one of his students to 
define Yoga, Guruji responded: “Yoga is when you see God everywhere”. His definition 
of Yoga, to me, seemed like a complete contradiction of Patañjali’s ontology. I was even 
more intrigued, when I noticed his reconciliation between caste, religion, and practice, for 
this meant he had different allegiances and ideologies as a Brahmin (priestly caste), a 
Śaivaite (follower of Śiva), and a Patañjala Yoga guru. For him, it seemed, the 
contradiction of these three paths was not the least problematic, which seems to be a very 
common attitude among many practitioners. However, I believe the problem arises when 
this attitude is translated from personal practice to scholarship, as it may feed the 
                                                        
1 Śrī K. Pattabhi Jois (1915-2009) was an Indian guru from Mysore, India, and the founder of the Kṛṣṇa 
Pattabhi Jois Aṣṭaṅga Yoga Institute (previously the Aṣṭaṅga Yoga Research Institute). 
 
 2
reductionism of unique and complex systems of thought during the process of 
reconciliation. 
 I began graduate school knowing I wanted to further explore the Yogasūtra of 
Patañjali, yet I was unsure what I wanted to focus on. While studying the text I came 
across a subject I had purposely ignored since I first became interested in Yoga 
philosophy: īśvara. All of the teachers I had come across in the past would be reluctant to 
fully define the nature of īśvara as well as its purpose and functionality within the 
tradition in a way that satisfied my inquiry. Some simply translated it as God, and 
additionally, others dismissed it completely as an optional path because of the 
presentation of īśvarapraṇidhāna2 in the first chapter of the Yogasūtra and completely 
ignored its involvement in the second chapter. The more objective scholars are on the 
topic, the more reluctant they seem to make a definite conclusion. Even though some 
scholars attempt to stay true to the ontology Patañjali’s Yogasūtra follow, nevertheless 
they contribute to the obscurity of the identity and nature of the term īśvara by continuing 
to use the terms ‘God’ or ‘Lord’ as a suitable translation. Thus, my motivation for the 
present study arises from my frustration in attempting to find an answer to the following 
questions: Who is īśvara? What is Yoga? And how does the definition of these two relate 
to each other? It is my sincere hope to be able to shed some light on this topic through a 
new perspective in the hermeneutics of Classical Yoga. 
                                                        
2 While these terms and concepts will be explored further throughout this study, particularly in Chapter 5, 
īśvarapraṇidhāna is presented in the first chapter of the Yogasūtra in sūtra I.23 as īśvarapraṇidhānadvā 
(īśvara + praṇidhāna + vā). The word vā is translated to ‘or’, which is a possible reason why it is 
sometimes interpreted as an alternative to other methods. However, this is only valid if the first chapter is 
isolated from the rest of the text, since īśvarapraṇidhāna is foundational to kriyāyoga and Aṣṭaṅga Yoga, 
presented in the second chapter, therefore, it should not be completely dismissed as an optional path. As 
this analysis will demonstrate, it is rather a functional method within the system of Patañjali Yoga. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Classical Yoga: The Yogasūtra of Patañjali 
 In many cases, and certainly most popularly, the term Yoga, deriving from the 
Sanskrit verb root ‘yuj’, meaning to yoke, has been translated as union. This translation 
prompts the need to define what is being joined, and hence how that definition of Yoga 
relates to the Yogasūtra of Patañjali and the path it propounds. Therefore, the primary 
motivation for the present study arises from the deceptively simple question: ‘what is 
Yoga’? And how and to what extent the understanding of the term īśvara in the 
Yogasūtra is a determinant of such definition. In an attempt to define Yoga, 3 it considers 
two opposing definitions: Yoga as ‘union’ and Yoga as ‘harnessing’, since the definition 
of the term would be directly related to the goal the system it comes to represent. Given 
the ambiguity of the term īśvara, its interpretation and translation would come to directly 
affect both the path and the ontology of Classical Yoga, as well as the interpretation and 
thus the understanding of the term Yoga itself. 
 The Yogasūtra is a work attributed to the Sage Patañjali, who, while his identity is 
not entirely clear, is understood to not have been the creator of the system of Yoga, but 
rather a compiler of an older system, or possibly a collection of different Yoga 
techniques. The identity of Patañjali as well as the date of the text are both uncertain. 
                                                        
3  Yoga. m. √yuj - “the act of yoking, joining, attaching, harnessing, putting to (of horses)... self-
concentration, abstract meditation, and mental abstraction practiced as a system (as taught by Patañjali and 
called the Yoga philosophy)” (Monier William 856). 
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While some attach him to mythological characters considering him to be the “incarnation 
of the thousand-headed serpent Ananta or Adiśeṣa ” (Burley 26), others have connected 
him with Patañjali “the grammarian and author of the Mahābhāṣya” (Müller 313), the 
great commentary on Pāṇini’s work on Classical Sanskrit grammar, the Aṣṭadhyāyī, thus 
placing the text around the second century BCE. “Scholars such as R. Garbe and S. N. 
Dasgupta maintain that the grammarian and the yoga writer are identical”. On the other 
hand, others place it as late as 500CE; however, many agree “that the Yogasūtra is a 
product of the second or third century CE” (Whicher, The Integrity of the Yoga Darśana 
42).   
 Of all the different practices of Yoga that have existed, Patañjali’s Yoga was 
considered to be the authoritative text to represent the system of Classical Yoga at the 
time the six Darśanas4  began to be categorized, most likely, because it is the most 
thorough text that devotes itself exclusively to the topic of the practice of Yoga. 
Furthermore, Patañjali “supplied Yoga with a reasonably homogenous framework that 
could stand up against the many rival traditions” (Whicher, The Integrity of the Yoga 
Darśana 43), as he had a greater focus on the practical application of the system rather 
that seeking to present a philosophical treatise in its own right. Instead of propounding a 
particular ontology in the text itself, Patañjali largely builds on the ontology of Classical 
Sāṃkhya, a system that has very often paired up with Classical Yoga as a consequence of  
their similar approaches. 
                                                        
4 Darśana: A philosophical category of the Classical Hindu philosophy literally meaning ‘to view or see’. 
The six categories or darśanas that together come to form Classical Hinduism are: Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, 
Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, and Uttara Mīmāṃsā. 
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 The Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is regarded as the authoritative text of Classical 
Sāṃkhya, and “the earliest available text on the Sāṃkhya philosophy”, considered to date 
at around the third century CE (Burley 16). While there is no known earlier Sāṃkhya 
text, it is generally assumed that the Sāṃkhyakārikā draws from a much older source, 
since not only the Yoga system derived from its philosophy, but there is also a wide 
range of texts throughout history that have drawn upon its concepts. Proto-Sāṃkhya is an 
unorganized pre-philosophical tradition that traces back Sāṃkhyan elements in other 
older texts, such as several major Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā. While it is 
considered by many to come from an earlier theistic philosophy (Nicholson 74), this 
conclusion seems to derive from the interpretation of the texts where these elements 
appear, for since there is no older Sāṃkhya text, it is impossible to determine the 
meaning of those elements in their own right (Krishna 195). In this light, Proto-Sāṃkhya 
appears to be the remnants of an ancient philosophy from where other philosophies either 
built upon or borrowed from without necessarily implying a complete adherence of these 
to the full ontology of the ancient Sāṃkhya, given there was ever such an organized 
system in the past. 
 The ontology of Classical Sāṃkhya (Sāṃkhyakārikā) is based on a dualistic model 
of “subject and object and which maintains that the fundamental error consists in their 
confusion or identification in any form or at any level” (Krishna 202). Sāṃkhya 
philosophy describes the universe to be made up of only two independent elements: 
puruṣa5 and prakṛti,6 which “are thus two ultimate, eternal and independent principles of 
                                                        
5 Puruṣa is everything that prakṛti is not. In contrast, it is the seer, or draṣṭṛ, that which only has the ability 
of seeing, but not the quality of being seen. 
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existence. Puruṣas are many, prakṛti is one” (Tiamni 189). The present study will 
demonstrate that Patañjali makes very clear that these two elements exist independent 
from each other as well as the fact that there is not one puruṣa or transcendental reality 
but rather a multitude of seers 7  in sūtra 4.15: “In view of the multiplicity of 
consciousness [as opposed] to the singleness of a [perceived] object, both [belong to] 
separate levels [of existence]“ (Feurstein, The Yoga Sūtra of Patañjali 134), as well as 
sūtra 2.22, where he explains that even though the perception or experience of prakṛti 
ceases to exist as such for the liberated seer, prakṛti itself does not.  
 The Yogasūtra of Patañjali, as the name implies, is a Yoga text written in sūtra 
style. A sūtra can be translated as ‘thread’; it is a popular style of writing in India, used 
by several systems of thought, where the aphorisms are used as a mnemonic device in the 
memorization of a particular text. Thus, by definition, a sūtra is concise and accurate, 
using the least amount of words possible in order to illustrate a particular point while 
maximizing the potential for expounding meaning. The Yogasūtra uses nouns almost 
exclusively, and rarely uses verbs. Because of the style and structure of the sūtras, they 
are mainly concerned with providing definitions, in many cases, in a very brief manner. 
The Yogasūtra is comprised of 196 sūtras or aphorisms, divided into four pādas, or 
chapters. The first chapter, samādhipāda, focuses on the different practices that lead to 
the attainment of samādhi. The second chapter, sādhanapāda, expands on several of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
6 Prakṛti is everything material, even in its most subtle forms, consisting of elements and sense organs, and 
is for the sake of puruṣa’s experience and transcendence. 
 
7 Throughout the present analysis the word ‘seer’ will be used as a translation for puruṣa, not to be 
confused with the ṛṣis, or ‘ancient seers’. 
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those practices and goes deeper into the nature of samādhi. The third chapter, 
vibhūtipāda, focuses on the great powers that may arise in the path of Yoga, and the 
fourth and final chapter, kaivalyapāda, explores the nature of the journey towards 
kaivalya, the final stage of Yoga. The relationships between the different sūtras are not 
always linear, are often interconnected, and thus, different connections and relationships 
within the text need to be considered. 
 
Defining Īśvara: A New Perspective in the Hermeneutics of Classical Yoga 
 There are several issues that arise in the endeavor of textual interpretation; from 
language and translation, historical and cultural context, to interpretation and application, 
thus, it becomes impossible to fully determine the intention and purpose of the original 
author, as well as the interpreters of such text, for more often than not, interpretation can 
be aligned with an attempt to perpetuate tradition and power. In many instances, since 
many commentators, whether intentionally or not, tend to interpret texts in a way that 
their work supports either their own personal world-views, or the systems they subscribe 
to, a particular text can be interpreted in a myriad of ways depending on what aspect of 
the text the commentator chooses to focus on, and which aspects they choose to ignore. 
Hence, inaccurate interpretations, even of a single term within one text, can lead to the 
inaccurate interpretation of the essence of the text, and come to misrepresent an entire 
system of thought, as well as perpetuate the authority of the different allegiances of such 
commentators. 
 There are many words and concepts in the Sanskrit language that do not have a 
direct translation into English, thus in many instances, translations have been made in 
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order to accommodate an author’s particular point of view. Indologist Max Müller speaks 
of the importance of translation and interpretation in “Sacred Books of the East”, stating 
that “we want to know the ancient religions such as they really were, not such as we wish 
they should have been” (Müller 636). Therefore, in cases where accuracy in translation is 
impossible to achieve, it becomes essential to work towards accurate interpretation, 
without making undue assumptions, and most importantly, without trying to fit foreign 
concepts into them in an attempt towards understanding. 
 The first problem that arises is the ambiguity of the term īśvara, for it has been used 
throughout history in different contexts and thus conveyed different meanings (see 
Chapter 4). While it becomes impossible to know the intention behind Patañjali’s 
decision to use such an ambiguous term, it is possible to at least try to understand its 
different uses throughout history as an attempt to identify the common use of the term 
contemporary to Patañjali, in order to understand the context in which he used this term. 
The second problem is the theistic interpretation of the term leading to the translation of 
īśvara as God, which has more serious consequences (see page 10).  Thirdly, the 
elevation of certain commentaries to be as authoritative, and in some instances, more 
authoritative than the original text, as in the case of Vyāsa’s Yogabhāṣya (see Chapter 2), 
perpetuates certain trends as facts, when in reality, they are not part of the original text. 
 Out of the total 196 sūtras, the term īśvara appears in the following eight sūtras, 
and out of those eight, after introducing īśvara, four are dedicated to defining it:  
I.23 īśvarapraṇidhānadvā - presents the concept of īśvarapraṇidhāna 
I.24 kleśakarmavipākāśayairaparāmṛṣtaḥ puruṣaviśeṣa īśvaraḥ - describes īśvara 
I.25 tatra niratiśayam sarvajñabījam - describes īśvara 
 9
I.26 pūrveṣamapi guruḥ kālenānavacchedāt - describes īśvara 
I.27 tasya vācakaḥ praṇavaḥ - describes īśvara and the method of īśvarapraṇidhāna 
II.1 tapaḥ svādhyāyeśvarapraṇidhānāni kriyāyogaḥ - defines kriyāyoga 
II.32 śaucasantoṣatapaḥsvādhyāyeśvarapraṇidhānāni niyamāḥ - defines niyama 
II.45 samādhisiddhirīśvarapraṇidhānāt - defines the effect of īśvarapraṇidhāna 
 Patañjali first introduces the term in sūtra I.23: īśvarapraṇidhānādvā, a concept 
which appears again in the second book of the Yogasūtra, first in sūtra II.1 as one of the 
three elements of kriyāyoga, and then in sūtra II.32 as one of five elements of niyama, 
the second limb of Patañjali’s eight-fold path. The term īśvarapraṇidhāna is a compound 
of the following two words: 
īśvara    able to do, capable of, liable, exposed to, master, lord, 
prince, king, mistress, queen, husband, God, the Supreme 
Being, the Supreme Soul (ātman), Śiva, one of the Rudras, 
the god of love, of a prince (Monier Williams 171). 
praṇidhānāt  laying on, fixing, applying, access, entrance, exertion, 
endeavor, respectful conduct, attention paid to, profound 
religious meditation, abstract contemplation of, vehement 
desire, vow, prayer (Monier Williams 660). 
 Only after ‘īśvara’ and ‘praṇidhānāt’ have been put together do they typically get 
translated as ‘devotion to the Lord’ or ‘devotion to God’, thus implying a theistic 
interpretation, rather than a more accurate representation of the functionality of the term 
within the system (explored further in Chapter 5).  According to the following definition, 
theism is a “worldview that perceives the orders of existence (physical things, organisms, 
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persons) as dependent for their being and continuance on one self-existent God, who 
alone is worthy of worship...Theists hold that God, transcendent creator of the orders, 
remains an indivisible unity as he sustains them in accordance with their capacities and 
his ultimate purposes” (Bertocci 9102). Such definition implies a God whose existence is 
independent from the realities and elements of the universe, as well as a creator and 
sustainer of everything that exists. However, the present study will demonstrate that in 
Classical Yoga, as in Sāṃkhya, creation “is from prakṛti [nature, the seen] alone without 
the assistance of any outside agency. The proximity of puruṣa [spirit, the seer] and 
prakṛti is a sufficient condition for the evolution and involution of the world” (Rukmani, 
“God/Īśvara in Indian Philosophy” 134). Therefore, the usage of the terms in relation to 
the system of Yoga, ‘God’ and ‘theism’, are both deemed as misplaced and misleading, 
for they consequently come to affect, and in some instances define, the meaning of the 
text and the system as a whole.  
 The present study proposes that the frequent translation of the term īśvara as ‘God’ 
presents several problems: first of all, it does not accurately represent the intent of the use 
and purpose of the term īśvara as used in the Yogasūtra, specifically obscuring the 
interpretation of īśvarapraṇidhāna, a functional aspect of the system. Secondly, it has 
directly led to the common understanding of the main distinction between Sāṃkhya and 
Yoga as the former being atheistic while the latter theistic, labels that come to 
misrepresent both systems. Lastly, it allows for the confusion regarding the path of 
Patañjali. It obscures this path of discrimination, separation, involution and isolation 
towards liberation, to a point where it can lend itself to be interpreted and accommodated 
to fit into other ideologies, thus enabling a syncretic trend that has led to the popular 
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understanding of Yoga as ‘union with the divine’. The present study describes Classical 
Yoga as an esoteric practice that follows a path of involution towards the pursuit of 
liberation; it does not seek a connection with an external reality but rather strives to 
separate from it. Thus, the root of the problem resides within the commentarial tradition: 
starting with the early theistic interpretation of the term īśvara which led to its translation 
as ‘God’, and the subsequent interpretation of its functionality within the system of 
Classical Yoga. 
 Because of many discrepancies and interpolations into the text, particularly 
regarding this issue, it becomes crucial to determine the identity and purpose of īśvara in 
order to fully understand Patañjali’s system of Yoga, particularly in regards to īśvara’s 
placement in the path of Yoga. The present study also attempts to answer the following 
questions: If īśvara is defined as an outside agent who has the power to actively get 
involved in the world and grant liberation to those who worship him, as some suggest, 
what is the purpose of the rest of his very elaborate system? Furthermore, if the path is 
understood as a means to interact and merge with an outside agent, which is a common 
theistic interpretation, would the meaning of the ultimate goal Patañjali describes, that of 
standing in isolation in one’s own nature (YSI.3, YSIV.34),8 not become contradictory 
and ultimately obsolete? 
 The purpose of the present study is threefold: (1) to define the use of the concept of 
īśvara in the system of Classical Yoga as found in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra, (2) to determine 
the theistic/atheistic nature of the concept and therefore the system of Classical Yoga, and 
                                                        
8 YS - yogasūtra (Patañjali) 
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(3) to identify the nature of the circumstances that have led to the obscurity of this 
subject. The present study attempts to define the concept of īśvara in the context of the 
Yogasūtra of Patañjali, through the analysis of Patañjali’s path, while attempting to 
identify the source of the many conflicting views regarding this issue. It does not seek to 
neither prove nor disprove the actual existence of God in any capacity, but rather focuses 
on the presence and relevance of theism within the path Patañjali proposes in his 
Yogasūtra. 
 The present study will follow a textual analysis of the Yogasūtra in its original 
Sanskrit in addition to its commentarial traditions, aiming to consider the commentaries 
independent of the original text in order to find the discrepancies between the core text 
and its commentaries, as well as analyze the commentarial works on the Yogasūtra in 
order to identify the hermeneutical trends that have led towards the discrepancies 
regarding the nature and purpose of īśvara. In turn, these hermeneutical trends will aid to 
establish the spectrum delineated by scholarship regarding the nature and purpose of 
īśvara within the Yogasūtra of Patañjali, from utterly useless to predominantly essential, 
within which reside a multitude of competing theories, and further attempting to place 
īśvara in the appropriate space within this spectrum. 
 On the one extreme Garbe describes the purpose for the inclusion of the term īśvara 
in the Yogasūtra to be an attempt by Patañjali to appeal to both the Vedic9 authorities and 
                                                        
9 Vedic: of the Vedas. This study considers the Vedas to not extend beyond the Saṃhitas, or collections: 
Ṛgveda (oldest, chants), Sāmaveda and Yajurveda (Melodies and sacrificial formulas), Atharaveda 
(youngest). Some early sources consider only three Vedas, while some scholars consider the Upaniṣads to 
be part of the Vedas. Chapter 3 (p. 32) describes the development of Brahmanic (Vedic) and Śramanic 
traditions as parallel yet radically different.  
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theistic popular beliefs10 (Feuerstein, Philosophy of Classical Yoga 3), thus making his 
system of Classical Yoga more appealing, as well as using this as an attempt to elevate 
Sāṃkhya philosophy through its association with his Yoga system (Dasgupta, Yoga 
Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems 248). On the other extreme of the spectrum there 
are scholars such as Vijñānabhikṣu who refer to īśvara in terms of the highest God, 
Parameśvara, describing him as the one who is “able to change the world, to bring it into 
existence and to make it disappear, just by his desire”. According to his definition īśvara 
is thus a creator, preserver and destroyer God (Rukmani, “Vijñānabhikṣu” 133), and 
moreover, the revealer of the Vedas. 
 Furthermore, many commentaries often diverge in their grammatical 
understandings of Patañjali’s Yogasūtra, which proves to be a very common trend, where 
Classical Yoga concepts are accommodated by the commentarial tradition with 
incompatible ideas, as an attempt to reconcile Yoga with other more prominent systems 
of thought. These inconsistencies can be seen as early as Vyāsa’s Yogabhāṣya, the first 
known commentary of the Yogasūtra, with his doctrine of sattva, which is original to 
Vyāsa, and not to Patañjali, as is the understanding of subsequent commentators. This 
situation proves to be particularly problematic since the status of Vyāsa’s commentary is 
elevated to the authority level of the original text, thus leading these interpolations to be 
perpetuated as fact often effecting modern scholarly understandings.  
 Therefore, the analysis of the present study will cover several levels of interpreting 
Patañjali’s Yogasūtras, and the different ways in which these interact. (1) Firstly, the 
                                                        
10 Indigenous and/or popular traditions, mostly dealing with strong devotional practices.  
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grammatical understanding of the original text, without the influence of the commentarial 
tradition. (2) The early commentarial tradition, Vyāsa’s Yogabhāṣya. (3) The medieval 
commentaries of Vācaspatimiśra and Vijñānabhikṣu. (4) Modern indigenous scholarship, 
particularly the way in which Swami Vivekananda presented Hinduism to the West; 
elevating Vedānta as the main philosophy of Hinduism and adapting it for a Christian 
audience. (5) Modern Western scholarship, focusing on Orientalists such as Müller and 
Deussen. (6) Finally, contemporary scholarship, such as Larson and Feuerstein, among 
others, and their respective understanding of the text. Thus, the present study seeks to 
explore an issue that has been often neglected, and in many instances, approached with 
great misunderstanding and misplaced assumptions, in an attempt to present a new 
perspective in the hermeneutics of Classical Yoga. 
 
Description of Chapters 
 Having stated and briefly explored the different issues that arise when attempting to 
define the term īśvara in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra, the following chapters will delve deeper 
into the matter. The organization of the present study’s chapters is as follows: 
 Chapter 2, “The Commentarial Tradition”, is an analysis of the commentarial 
tradition of Classical Yoga, in an attempt to identify and categorize the different 
hermeneutical trends that have led to the obscurity of the subject, introducing prominent 
commentators and their trends in order to identify the different issues of translation and 
interpretation that arise from these.  
 Chapter 3, “Deconstructing Hinduism”, as an expansion of Chapter 2, is an analysis 
of the underlying reasons for some of these hermeneutical trends, by placing Patañjali’s 
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Yogasūtra in the general context of the development of Hinduism, as well as an attempt 
to understand the classification of Classical Yoga as a Hindu Darśana, along with its 
consequences.  
 Chapter 4, “The etymology of the term īśvara and its Pre-Classical History”, is a 
survey of the pre-classical use of the term īśvara, tracing its origin and use in different 
Indian texts throughout history, from its use to denote a worldly lord, to its use as a 
personal God, as well as the influence of devotional sectarian practices that have 
contributed to its interpretation as God.   
 While it becomes impossible to know the intention behind Patañjali’s decision to 
use such an ambiguous term, it is possible to attempt to understand the context in which 
he used it. Chapter 5, “The Path of Classical Yoga: Reading Patañjali without 
commentary”, is the product of a grammatical analysis of Patañjali’s Yogasūtra without 
relying on the use of commentary, primarily focusing on the translation of the first 
chapter, samādhipāda, and a selection of sūtras from the second chapter, sādhanapāda, 
as well as deeper grammatical analysis on the sūtras that directly deal with the issue of 
īśvara, in order to understand Patañjali’s path of Yoga independent of commentaries, and 
the role of īśvara in the system of Classical Yoga exclusively. It contrasts this 
interpretation with those of the commentarial tradition from Chapter 2, specifically 
addressing the issue of the identity of īśvara in the Yogasūtra, as well as defining the 
functionality of īśvarapraṇidhāna in the path Patañjali proposes. 
 Finally, Chapter 6 is the conclusion of the present study, where the term īśvara 
emerges as the representation of an empirical concept and a functional component of the 
path of Yoga, rather than an ontological concept per se. Thus, much rather than being or 
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representing God, and thus being the determinant for the system of Classical Yoga to be 
classified as theistic, īśvara represents the ultimate ideal of the goal of Yoga: a puruṣa 
that has never lost its identity to its misidentification with prakṛti, and as such, it 
functions as a practical and experiential tool, by being an archetype of this ultimate 
reality, providing the yogi with a direct experience of puruṣa, where he is able to get a 
direct glimpse of its true nature. The role of īśvara is therefore akin to the instruction 
manual Patañjali presents: a series of practical tools that facilitate a series of experiences 
which lead towards an ultimate goal: kaivalya, or isolation of self.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE COMMENTARIAL TRADITION 
 
 Although the sūtra style presents sets of rules or philosophical points of views in a 
way which facilitates for strict memorization, thus preserving the identity and accuracy of 
a text, it comes along with a commentarial tradition that, while necessary for the 
understanding of the sūtras, allows for interpretation - or a series of interpretations - that 
can at times depart far away from the original text and furthermore be taken as an 
authoritative text itself. As commentators attempt to reconcile the text they are 
commenting on with their other areas of studies as well as their own personal viewpoints 
and philosophical and/or religious beliefs, the product of these attempts is a new text that 
is taken as an authority in the field and thus used by subsequent commentators as an 
authoritative source for their own work, in many cases without questioning the motives 
behind the work of these previous commentators, contributing to the diluting of certain 
concepts as they perpetuate conflicting ideas and confusion. In most cases the end 
product is an authoritative work that is a commentary of a commentary of a commentary; 
a work that is the result of an amalgamation of conflicting ideologies borrowed from 
other schools of thought which yet leaves no specific trace of their origin and the reasons 
for having been included in such a way, thus leaving the only conclusion of being an 
attempt at reconciliation due to the commentators’ own personal motives.  
 Chapter 2 is an analysis of the hermeneutics of Classical Yoga, focusing on the 
identity, purpose and use of the term īśvara in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra, from translation and 
interpretation of the term itself, as well as the commentators’ theistic/atheistic 
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classification of the text as a whole. It attempts to identify and categorize the different 
hermeneutical trends that have led towards the discrepancies regarding the nature and 
purpose of īśvara, covering the different categories of interpreting Patañjali’s Yogasūtra, 
and the different ways in which these interact both between each other, as well as with 
the original text. The chapter addresses two of the main issues that arise in the endeavor 
of textual interpretation described in Chapter 1: firstly, the theistic interpretation of the 
term leading to the translation of īśvara as God, and secondly, the elevation of certain 
commentaries to be as authoritative, and in some instances, more authoritative than the 
original text, as in the case of Vyāsa’s Yogabhāṣya.  
 The Commentarial tradition of Classical Yoga can be divided into 5 different 
categories, according to time period and geographical location. (1) The early 
commentarial tradition, dating back to the 7-8th century CE (Woods xx), with the first 
commentary of the Yogasūtra, Vyāsa’s Yogabhāṣya. (2) The medieval commentaries of 
Vācaspatimiśra’s Tattvavaiśāradī of the 9th century CE (Woods xxi) and Vijñānabhikṣu’s 
Yogavārttika of the 16th century CE (Rukmani, “Yogavārttika of Vijñānabhikṣu” 3). (4) 
Modern indigenous scholarship, of the late 19th century to early 20th century CE, with the 
works of Dasgupta and Radhakrishnan. (5) Modern Western scholarship, focusing on 
Orientalists such as Müller, Deussen and Garbe. (6) Finally, contemporary scholarship, 
such as Eliade, Larson and Feuerstein, among others. While each author has, for the most 
part, a particular position on the issue of īśvara, there are certain trends that are 
particularly prevalent to certain time periods and locations. The underlying causes for 
these trends will be addressed in Chapter 3, as it becomes necessary to place the text in 
the context of Classical Hinduism, and its categorization as a Hindu Darśana, for the 
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present study argues that some of these trends are directly related to the distinction 
between Classical yoga and its ‘partner’ Darśana, Sāṃkhya, as the former being theistic 
and the later atheistic. 
 
Vyāsa’s Doctrine of Sattva 
 One of the elements not obviously defined by Patañjali is the degree of activity and 
involvement of īśvara in the yogi’s path towards realization. If īśvara is a puruṣa (I.24), 
and thus by definition inactive within prakṛti (Majumdar 52), in which way or form does 
he indeed “favor” the yogi due to “[this yogin’s] profound-desire” (Vyāsa qtd. in Woods 
48)? Vyāsa’s attempt to solve this problem, which was fully accepted and supported by 
Vācaspatimiśra and Vijñānabhikṣu, is by explaining that īśvara, “by its own nature, 
cannot intervene in the spatio-temporal processes of Nature”, therefore, he must acquire 
“a medium through which He can exert his influence”: perfect sattva11 (Feuerstein, “The 
Concept of God in Classical Yoga” 386). Vyāsa thus considers īśvara to be “a special 
kind of Self” (Vyāsa qtd. in Woods 49) who is “at all times whatsoever liberated” (qtd. in 
Woods 50) and, “through his perfect sattvic state, active in the world as a remover of 
obstacles” (qtd. in Woods 62).  
 Vācaspatimiśra presents a yet stronger Brahmanic12  position than Vyāsa, as he 
legitimizes the omniscience of īśvara by the authoritativeness of the Vedas, and 
                                                        
11 Sattva: Prakṛti or nature is made of the interaction between three qualities or guṇas: Sattva, rajas, and 
tamas. Sattva “connotes the bright, light, buoyant, wise, good, transparent aspects of nature” (Potter 3709).     
 
12 Brahmanic: of the Brahmins, or India’s priestly [and highest] caste. A tradition that is rooted in the 
Vedas, and is characterized by being exoteric, this-worldly, and intensely ritualistic. 
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delegitimizes the authoritativeness of other authors, such as the Buddha and the Sage 
Kāpila, by describing their work as “pseudo-sacred-words” and “deceitful”, hence 
elevating the Brahmanic tradition as the only legitimate source of authority 
(Vācaspatimiśra qtd. in Woods 57).  He not only agrees with the doctrine of sattva 
proposed by Vyāsa, stating that īśvara “reflects, and assumes a sattva of perfect quality” 
(qtd. in Woods 52), as well as the fact that the proof of īśvara’s existence and ability to 
interact in this world to be his revelation of the śāstras or “sacred books”, “[which] are 
composed by the īśvara” (qtd. in Woods 53), but he further validates and strengthens 
these positions, clearly perceiving Vyāsa as the highest authority in understanding 
Patañjali’s Yogasūtra.  He then sustains this point by going back around and stating that, 
since “there is no possibility of error or deceit” in a state of “perfect sattva”, it “[then] is 
established that sacred books have their proof in the perfect quality of His sattva” (qtd. in 
Woods 54). Hence, he uses a circular argument in order to prove īśvara’s appropriation 
of sattva: the proof of īśvara’s omniscience is in the infallibility of the śāstras, and the 
authority of the śāstras is in the omniscience of īśvara. According to Dasgupta, Vyāsa 
had resorted to the śāstra argument as proof of īśvara’s sattva due to the fact that he had 
no other way of substantiating his position, for his doctrine of sattva “had no place in the 
system” (Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems of Indian Thought 
249). 
 Feuerstein challenges Vyāsa’s doctrine of sattva by asking: “If liberation signifies 
the unconditional transcendence of the sattva (together with all other qualities of Nature, 
and thus Nature itself), then, how can the Lord be perpetually associated with a sattva 
without forsaking his condition of Freedom?” (Feuerstein, “The Concept of God in 
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Classical Yoga” 393). Unfortunately, he concludes there is no answer for this question. 
“Vyāsa’s (YBh I.24)13 answer is a dogmatic assertion that the association of the Lord 
with a pure sattva is beginningless”, Vācaspatimiśra (TV I.24)14 states “the perfect sattva 
of the Lord can neither be conceived nor inferred” and considers its proof to be the 
scriptures which he believes are revealed by īśvara himself, while “Bhoja (RM I.23)15 
bluntly argues that one should not ask this question, because the logical problem involved 
is one of what we would call the chicken-and-egg variety” (Feuerstein, “The Concept of 
God in Classical Yoga” 394).  
 On the surface, Vyāsa’s theory might be a viable solution to explain īśvara’s 
activity in the world, however, it appears to be a pure fabrication, as it makes no 
reference to the original text, which he uses to prove his presentation of īśvara as an 
active and powerful agent in the evolution of both prakṛti and man towards realization. 
As “the authorities of Classical Yoga ultimately make this doctrine a matter of belief” 
(Feuerstein, “The Concept of God in Classical Yoga” 394), it becomes clear from 
comparing the original text and Vyāsa’s commentary that Vyāsa’s doctrine of sattva, 
however a clever attempt to solve an important discrepancy, is original to Vyāsa, and not 
Patañjali. This distinction, however, is not implicitly made by neither Vyāsa or by 
subsequent commentators, and thus it is regarded as Vyāsa’s clarification of Patañjali’s 
work, rather than a doctrine that is exclusively original to him. Thus, Vyāsa’s doctrine of 
                                                        
13 YBh - yogabhāṣya (Vyāsa) 
 
14 TV - tattvavaiśāradī (Vacaspatimiśra) 
 
15 RM - rājamārṭāṇda (Bhoja) 
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sattva has been used in subsequent commentaries as if it was original to Patañjali, and as 
a consequence, perpetuated as fact.  
 
Vijñānabhikṣu’s Syncretic Trend 
 Vijñānabhikṣu is the most prominent exponent of the syncretic trend in the 
hermeneutics of Classical Yoga. A yogi at heart (Matilal 9595) at a time in which, “in the 
philosophical field, Vedānta16 was at its height and on the other hand, in the religious 
field, Bhakti was gaining supremacy”, Vijñānabhikṣu attempts to reconcile his personal 
beliefs with the current trends “in order to establish Yoga in a Vedāntic [and Bhakta] 
atmosphere” (Rukmani, Yogavārttika of Vijñānabhikṣu 8). He speaks of īśvara in terms 
of the highest God, Parameśvara, stating that he “is able to change the world, to bring it 
into existence and to make it disappear, just by his desire”. Īśvara in his view is thus a 
creator, preserver and destroyer God (Rukmani, “Vijñānabhikṣu: A Maverick 
Philosopher” 133).   
 Rukmani does not consider Vijñānabhikṣu to be “faithful to the text he professes to 
comment on”, for he is too intent in “conceding a bhakti viewpoint into the Yoga 
philosophy”, going against the path Patañjali describes in the sūtras themselves (further 
detailed in Chapter 5) as well as Vyāsa’s commentary. He further attempts to substantiate 
his theistic and bhakti views by explaining “sūtras I.23-24 in terms of how īśvara can 
bring about quickly asaṃprajñāta-yoga and kaivalya17 for the devotee who practices 
                                                        
16 Vedānta: Veda + anta. Translates to End of the Vedas. Main collection of texts: Upaniṣads. As a 
Darśana: Uttara Mīmāṃsā. 
 
17  Asaṃprajñāta-yoga and kaivalya: asaṃprajñāta is the highest form of samādhi before attaining 
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bhakti”; elevating the functionality of īśvara in the text, through īśvarapraṇidhāna, as 
essential for achieving liberation (Rukmani, Yogavārttika of Vijñānabhikṣu Vol.2 xi) and 
“emphatically dismisses Sāṃkhya” and its position that “liberation (kaivalya) can be 
achieved through reasoning” (Rukmani, “Vijñānabhikṣu: A Maverick Philosopher” 135). 
The result of his attempts to reconcile these different systems of thought ultimately 
misrepresents the Bhakti, Vedānta and Yoga traditions, for, Rukmani states, “in his hands 
Advaita Vedānta, Yoga, and Bhakti all get transformed” (Rukmani, “Vijñānabhikṣu: A 
Maverick Philosopher” 143). 
 Another important issue of interpretation is when a commentator presents 
conflicting views, either within the same publication or in their different works. This 
situation appears in many cases and at different levels. On the milder side, there are 
commentators, such as Feuerstein, who translate the term īśvara as  ‘Lord’ yet speaks of 
him in theistic terms. Then there are those, such as Eliade, who actually use the term 
‘God’ as a translation of īśvara, however giving the term God a new definition in this 
context that is more in line with the ontology the Yogasūtra follows. On the most extreme 
cases, there are those, such as Dasgupta, who have complete contradictory views of the 
identity and purpose of īśvara in different publications.  
 Feuerstein, in spite of considering the common translation of īśvara by the “totally 
ambiguous word ‘god’” as problematic, for the īśvara “is neither the creator, upholder or 
destroyer of the universe, nor is he judge over good and evil, right and wrong, nor 
supreme arbiter of human fates” (Feuerstein, The Yoga Sūtra of Patañjali xi), his choice 
                                                                                                                                                                     
kaivalya, or isolation of self, the goal of Patañjala Yoga. 
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of language is not always in line with this statement. For example, when speaking of 
saṃprajñāta samādhi described in YS I.17, Feuerstein states that the cittavṛttinirodaḥ 
(cessation of mind processes) is not enough to attain this level of samādhi, supporting his 
argument with sūtra II.45, samādhisiddhirīśvarapraṇidhānāt (perfection of samādhi 
comes from īśvarapraṇidhāna), taken out of context, and declaring: “It appears that the 
‘grace’ of the ‘lord’ (īśvara) is also required” (Feuerstein, The Yogasūtra of Patañjali 
37). His choice and use of the words ‘grace’ and ‘lord’ in this context appear to have a 
very theistic, and rather Christian tone.  
 Eliade states īśvara “is not a creator god, for the cosmos, life, and humanity 
proceed from the primordial substance, prakṛti”. For him, īśvara “plays a rather minor 
role” as an alternative path for “devotional yogins” (YS I.23). Despite his new definition 
of the term God, Eliade uses the term God as a translation for īśvara (Eliade, “Yoga” 
9896). This proves to be very confusing for those readers who have a preconceived idea 
of the meaning of God. The introduction of a new and different definition for the term 
‘God’ does not suffice in redefining the understanding of a word loaded with a very 
specific meaning for such a large population. 
 Dasgupta presents very different views regarding the nature and purpose of īśvara 
in three different books. In Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems of Indian 
Thought Dasgupta does not portray īśvara as a necessary intelligence for the functioning 
of prakṛti, stating that the mere proximity of puruṣa to prakṛti is enough to spark and 
sustain evolution, and the doctrine of karma being enough to sustain order in the world 
(Dasgupta 235-236). As īśvara does not quite fit “its system of metaphysics” it is “but 
loosely introduced, more as a matter of traditional faith than as having a place in the 
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system of philosophy. He is introduced as only one of the alternative objects of 
concentration”, albeit an object of superior importance over all others, for īśvara can 
“remove the obstacles and make the attainment of the goal of the yogin much easier” 
(Dasgupta 246).  
 In A History of Indian Philosophy, Dasgupta portrays a much more active īśvara, as 
an “intelligent Being who should help the course of evolution” (Dasgupta 260). He does 
not consider īśvara to be the creator of prakṛti but rather a puruṣa himself, although one 
who is able to disturb “the equilibrium of the prakṛti”, whose by his “permanent will... 
the guṇas follow naturally an intelligent course of evolution for the service of the best 
interests of the puruṣas”. Furthermore, this īśvara helps prakṛti “to follow an intelligent 
order by which the fruits of karma are properly distributed and the order of the world is 
brought about” (Dasgupta 260). Thus īśvara here is not only the initial trigger of 
evolution but fully active in the world, the one who controls the order of the guṇas and 
the distribution of the “fruits of karma”. 
 In Yoga as philosophy and Religion he begins to use the terms īśvara and God 
interchangeably. He does acknowledge “that the Bhāṣya18 or the sūtras [do not] ever 
mention Him as having anything to do with the controlling of the modifications of the 
prakṛti by removing the barriers”, but he states, “all the latter commentators agree in 
holding him responsible for the removal of all barriers in the way of prakṛti’s 
development” (Dasgupta 87). While he states that “it is on account of God that we can do 
good or bad actions and thus acquire merit or demerit”, on the very next line he 
                                                        
18 Bhāṣya: commentary. 
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continues: “Of course God is not active and cannot cause any motion in prakṛti” 
(Dasgupta 87). He concludes that somehow he accomplishes this “in such a way that he 
stands ultimately responsible for the removal of all obstacles” in the development of both 
prakṛti and man, so that perhaps he is not fully active, but can somehow have an effect in 
the world (Dasgupta 88).  
 Ultimately, in his “God in Yoga” chapter, he presents Yoga as karmayoga, 
jñānayoga, and bhaktiyoga,19 the last of which he declares to be the “easiest means of 
attaining salvation” (Dasgupta, Yoga as Philosophy and Religion 159).  In this book he 
presents a fully theistic and Vedic notion of īśvara, as the source of the Vedas and able to 
preside over the laws of karma, and who, “just as a king, ...punishes or rewards people as 
they deserve” (160).  He further interprets īśvarapraṇidhāna in full bhakti style: “By 
devotion (bhakti) īśvara is drawn towards the devotee ... and by his grace he removes all 
obstructions of illness, etc ... So for a person who can love or adore īśvara, this is the 
easiest course of attaining samādhi” (161).  It thus becomes impossible to fully 
comprehend Dasgupta’s point of view regarding the identity of īśvara, for it is ever 
changing.   
 
Issues with the Functionality of Īśvarapraṇidhāna 
 When coming at odds with attempting to reconcile a theistic interpretation of 
īśvarapraṇidhāna with a strict dualistic ontology, some scholars, such as Garbe, have 
simply attempted to either downplay īśvara’s role or make away with the extent of 
                                                        
19 The Bhagavadgītā describes Yoga as being of three types: karmayoga, jñānayoga, and bhaktiyoga. 
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īśvara’s functionality in the Yoga system entirely. Garbe considers īśvara to have been 
included by Patañjali in order to appease the Vedic authorities and elevate his work in an 
atmosphere where theism prevailed. (Garbe, “Outlines of a History of Indian Philosophy” 
588). For Zaehner, īśvara appears as a disposable aid in the yogi’s path, having been 
introduced “for no other purpose than to help the soul towards isolation”, most likely 
being “borrowed from one of the current theistic systems”, once “this purpose has been 
served, the God is discarded and the yogin passes beyond him to the real business of 
mental concentration, the achievement of kaivalya or ‘isolation’”  (Zaehner 127). 
Rukmani considers īśvara to be “only one among many supports in meditation”, having 
“been accommodated in a backhanded manner into Yoga philosophy by Patañjali”, for it 
does not seem to be compatible with the rest of the system (Rukmani, “God/Īśvara in 
Indian Philosophy” 134).  
 Müller states that Patañjali’s use of the term īśvara was not such a source of debate 
in the past, or at least there is no evidence in there being a philosophical debate on the 
matter (Müller, The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy 319). He considers 
īśvarapraṇidhāna to be an optional path (Müller, The Six Systems of Yoga Philosophy 
308), and the inclusion of term īśvara in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra to not necessarily be a 
determinant in qualifying the whole text as theistic, as he defines īśvara as “originally no 
more than one of the many souls, or rather Selves or Puruṣas, but one that has never been 
associated with or implicated in metempsychosis, supreme in every sense, yet of the same 
kind as all other Puruṣas. The idea of other Puruṣas obtaining union with him could 
therefore never have entered Patañjali's head”. According to Müller, “the highest object 
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of the yogin was freedom, aloneness, aloofness, or self-centeredness” (Müller, The Six 
Systems of Yoga Philosophy 325).   
 Yet, īśvarapraṇidhāna is not mentioned only once, but in three different places in 
the text: first introduced as an alternate path of meditation in YSI.23, then as one of the 
three elements of kriyāyoga in YSII.1, and lastly as one of the five niyama, or 
observances of aṣṭaṅgayoga in YSII.32 and YSII.45. It is not mentioned loosely in three 
places, but rather as part of three different paths the Yogasūtra puts forward. Although it 
seems more manageable to label īśvara as not a relevant or important part of the Yoga 
system, this proves to be as much a fabrication and as inaccurate and misleading as 
considering īśvara to be synonymous with God or Brahman. This, most likely, is the 
result of a reaction to both a strong syncretic and theistic trend, both of which have been 
present, to a certain extent, since the time of Vyāsa.  
 While some commentators attempt to define īśvara as a philosophical concept and 
its placement in the Yoga ontology, others have focused on the more practical aspects of 
the concept. According to Burley, Patañjali’s very definition of īśvara as a “‘special self’ 
(puruṣa-viśeṣa) is crucial, as it implies that īśvara is not to be regarded as constituting a 
distinct ontological category” (Burley 50), but rather in the experiential realm (Feurstein, 
Classical Yoga 3). “Considering the distinctly pragmatic orientation of his Yoga”, 
(Whicher, The Integrity of the Yoga Darśana 84) Patañjali must have included the 
concept of īśvara in his work because, according to Eliade, “īśvara corresponded to an 
experiential reality” resulting from a long tradition of yogic techniques. Thus, īśvara 
represents the ideal for the yogi to reach, “an archetype of the yogin - a macroyogin”, 
whose concept might have been inherited from his position as “a patron of certain yogic 
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sects” (Eliade, Yoga 75). Thus, according to Whicher “īśvara might have met primarily 
psychological and pedagogical needs rather than providing a purely ontological category” 
(Whicher, The Integrity of the Yoga Darśana 85).   
 
Conclusion 
 The conflicting variety of not only different translations and interpretations but 
different approaches to defining the term īśvara as well as its placement and function 
within the Yoga system has, on the one hand, contributed to the many misconceptions on 
the subject, since, without much further and deeper investigation, and a full 
understanding of the system as a whole, it can lend itself to people picking and choosing 
whatever views are in agreement with their own. On the other hand, it is a testimony of 
the wealth of the commentarial tradition of Classical Yoga, one which, by attempting to 
peel away the layers of intentions, traditions and allegiances, is available to potentially 
illuminate on the subject rather than obscure it. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DECONSTRUCTING HINDUISM 
 
 The very nature of the sūtra style of writing prompts a dependency on commentary 
which, while at times can be enlightening, in many cases, it can depart so far away from 
the original text that it creates a series of contradictions and discrepancies that further 
obscure the essence of its meaning. Since the many approaches and discrepancies 
regarding the identity and purpose of the term īśvara in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra are not 
arbitrary, it is not only important to understand its nature and functionality within the 
constraints of the original text (see Chapter 5), but it also becomes imperative to identify 
the circumstances that have led to the numerous approaches and discrepancies that have 
contributed to the obscurity of this topic.  
 After reviewing the commentarial tradition of Classical Yoga and the most 
prominent hermeneutical trends that arise from them in the previous Chapter, the next 
step in this analysis is to place both philosophy and term within the context of the 
development of Hinduism, as well as attempting to understand the underlying meaning of 
the classification of Classical Yoga as a Hindu Darśana, along with its consequences. 
Hence, Chapter 3, as an expansion of Chapter 2, is an analysis of the underlying reasons 
for some of the hermeneutical trends that have led towards the discrepancies regarding 
the nature and purpose of īśvara, in order to fully understand them, instead of simply 
dismissing certain interpretations and labeling as incorrect.  
 The catalyst for the syncretic trend that plays an essential role in the 
misrepresentation of Patañjali’s path of Yoga is a homogenizing trend that primarily 
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arises from a necessity to perpetuate Vedic authority that starts as a reaction against the 
rise of the Upaniṣadic movement. Further, this homogenizing trend is then continued by 
the need to categorize Hinduism into a cohesive system with agreeable components, 
arising from the necessity to organize against the rise of traditions, such as Jainism, but 
particularly Buddhism, that vehemently denied the authority of the Vedas. This gave birth 
to the ambiguous categorization of the āstikas and the nāstikas, the agreers and the 
deniers, which are directly tied to the emergence of the six Darśanas, or orthodox 
systems of though, as the philosophies that constitute Classical Hinduism. This 
homogenizing trend is further strengthened by the desire to elevate Hinduism as a world 
religion as a reaction against the negative depiction of Hindu traditions by Christian 
missionaries during the British colonialism of India, which, further strengthens Vedic 
authority and ultimately legitimizes Hinduism as a world religion, finally emerging not 
only as a homogenous system but further presented, in many instances, as a monotheistic 
religion, and thus, elevated to the authority of the Abrahamic religions. 
 While there are advocates of both sides of the spectrum, “the idea of Hindu unity is 
neither a timeless truth nor a fiction wholly invented by the British to regulate and control 
their colonial subjects”, the later which is caused by “tendentious readings based on a 
modern tendency to homogenize and oversimplify pre-modern Indian history” 
(Nicholson 2). The present study agrees with the theory that the use of Hinduism as a 
religious term is not considered to have been in use until after India’s medieval period 
(Nicholson 196). Hence, it is more aligned with the view that the homogenizing trend 
was an indigenous trend that developed slowly throughout centuries, and that eventually 
was perpetuated and strengthened as a reaction to foreign control and influences.  
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 “The word ‘Hinduism’ is loaded with historical and political resonances, ... with 
proponents and detractors, open to varied interpretations” (Nicholson 1), demonstrating 
to be much more complex than a religion or a set of philosophies. It is a multiplicity of 
intertwined world-views in constant interaction with each other, agreeing and 
disagreeing, approving and disproving. From exoteric rituals and esoteric practices, oral 
traditions and ancient texts, familial lineages and popular celebrations, all of these come 
together to form what has come to be labeled as Hinduism. From its heterogeneous nature 
arises the need to reconcile the different conflicting ideologies and practices that 
comprise it. While this approach is perfectly acceptable and understandable for 
someone’s personal practice in order to form their own particular set of beliefs and 
world-views, in academia, it presents a very problematic situation. It thus becomes the 
scholar’s responsibility to be able to understand different ideologies in their own right, 
abstaining as much as possible from the necessity to resolve the many differences that 
will arise, but rather being able to understand and embrace the uniqueness of the myriad 
of traditions. 
 
Brahmanism vs. Śramanism 
 In spite of the many proposers of the concept that Modern Hinduism can be traced 
all the way back to the Vedas, and perhaps beyond, in an unbroken line of transmission, 
there is a clear divergence in the intention and practice between the Vedic and the 
Upaniṣadic traditions.  From the two main classifications in the development of 
philosophy and religion in India, the former belongs to the Brahmanic tradition and the 
latter to the Śramanic tradition. Garbe considers Śramanic traditions to have developed 
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parallel to the Brahmanic tradition in India “as lineages that, having begun with an 
individual or small group of philosopher-sages, then followed a line of descent running 
from guru to disciple. Over time, because a single teacher can have several disciples, a 
number of lineages would tend to develop”, and as these were oral traditions, in time, 
they gave rise to a number of different systems of thought which held certain 
commonalities, such as Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Upaniṣads, and Buddhism (Burley 38).  
 The main general distinction between Brahmanic and Śramanic traditions is their 
contrasting paths and goals. The intention of Brahminic practices is focused on rituals for 
the maintenance of the order of the universe (ṛta) by sacrifice to the gods, as well as 
rituals that sought to maintain order within nature and society, being conducted and thus 
controlled by the Brahmin or priestly caste. “Centered around the household fire 
sacrifice” (Herman 52), this was a path towards prosperity, both material (food, wealth, 
etc) and immaterial (after life in Heaven - svārga) in this world (Herman 54), rather than 
a vehicle towards transcending it. Furthermore, the source of wisdom in the Brahmanic 
tradition is external, and thus ‘heard’, instead of realized.  
 Revelation in Hinduism is of two categories; śrūti and smṛti. Śrūti is direct 
revelation, literally meaning ‘heard’ (Dhavamony, “Revelation in Hinduism” 163), while 
smṛti is considered indirect or secondary, as it is revelation based on memory of śrūti 
(Dhavamony, “Revelation in Hinduism” 164).  The Vedas are considered apauruṣeya, or 
impersonal śrūti (Hiltebeitel 3994) as its wisdom was literally ‘heard’ by the ancient 
seers or ṛṣis of India in the form of speech, or Vāk, and transmitted orally for centuries 
(Dhavamony, “Hindu Spirituality” 10).  Thus revelation is of utmost importance, as it is 
considered to reveal truths that would be impossible to attain otherwise. Even though 
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there are supernatural elements attributed to the ṛṣis (Dhavamony, “Revelation in 
Hinduism” 166), they are not considered to be the authors of the Vedas, but rather 
passive transmitters of information (Watson 36). The revelation of the Vedas, therefore, 
is extrinsic to the ṛṣis that received it, which, implied by the term śrūti (heard), came to 
them in the form of sound or words. 
 While the ṛṣis are the witnesses or receptors of such revelation, the source is not 
always as clear as it is, for example, it the Abrahamic religions. At the time of the early 
Vedas the ṛṣis did not seem to have a concept of a Supreme Being or creator. The gods 
and myths seem to arise from the minds of people who were in awe at the powers of the 
universe, who in an attempt to explain and control the world around them, “imagined that 
each of the great provinces of the universe was directed and animated by its own separate 
deity” (Muir 339). The gods were seen as personified representations of the powers of the 
universe, embodying the qualities of the elements they represented. The gods, as the ṛṣis, 
are seen as intermediaries, albeit more powerful, between men and the underlying power 
of the universe.  
 In this passage from the Ṛgveda (10.129), known as the Hymn of creation, it is 
obvious that even then they did not fully understand the origin of the universe, nor did 
they attempt to reach a definite conclusion. There is an understanding, however, that the 
gods were not the creators, since they were created themselves after the creation of the 
universe, and furthermore, not capable to solve the mysteries of the universe.  
There was neither nonentity nor entity; there was no atmosphere nor sky above… 
There were impregnating powers and mighty forces, a self-supporting principle 
beneath, and energy aloft. Who knows, who here can declare, whence has sprung, 
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whence, this creation? The gods are subsequent to the formation of this 
[universe]; who then know hence it arose? From what this creation arose, and 
whether [any one] made it or not – He who in the highest heaven is its ruler, he 
verily knows, or [even] he does not know. (qtd. in Muir 345) 
 The second line suggests a very abstract conception of Brahman, a powerful 
energy that supports and sustains the universe. “The name ‘Brahman’ initially meant any 
sacred or magical formula. As time passed by, ‘Brahman’ came to be identified, not with 
the words or chants that conjured up the gods and their power but with the Power itself” 
(Herman 62). But the concept of Brahman as unattached from Vedic ritual is not fully 
developed until later, in the development of the Brāhmanas (Hiltebeitel 3991). The last 
line suggests that perhaps there is no creator; for if the highest God does not know about 
the origin of creation, creation could have preceded Him as well. 
 In many instances Brahman is translated as ‘God’, which can present as an 
obstacle in the search of a definition. Since many assumptions are made by the use of this 
word, the result can be of inaccuracy and confusion. In many instances Brahman is 
perceived as a deity, therefore, early Vedic religion is seen as polytheistic, being centered 
on a pantheon of anthropomorphic deities. In this view, the word ‘God’ for Brahman is 
easily confused with the word ‘gods’ for the deities. Also to be considered is the fact that 
in the Vedas, several different gods are regarded as the source of knowledge and creation. 
However, also found within the Vedas are statements that explain that in the end, all gods 
are the same, “They call him Indra, Mitra, Varuṇa, Agni; and (he is) the celestial well-
winged Garutmat. Sages name variously that which is but One” (Muir 342). 
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 In time, many of these early deities that the ṛṣis received the śrūti from “would 
disappear eventually or take secondary place in the Hindu pantheon” (Dhavamony, 
“Revelation in Hinduism” 166). However, there is still a focus on their power and its 
ability to interact in the maintenance of the universe (Muir 341), which towards the later 
parts of the Ṛgveda allows the Brahmins to directly engage with that underlying energy 
or power during the action of ritual. This power behind all elements of the universe, that 
can be interacted with during Vedic ritual, begins to be identified independently from 
attachments, leading to be conceived as the Absolute. “Stripped of mythical and 
ritualistic elements, it becomes identified with the universal Self (Brahman) or the 
Absolute” (Dhavamony, “Revelation in Hinduism” 180). Thus “the stage was set for 
seeking solutions not by turning outwardly to the gods, whether with priestly help and 
sacrifices or not, but by turning within oneself to where Brahman resides” (Herman 64), 
beginning the transition from the exoteric practices of the Vedas towards the esoteric 
practices of the Upaniṣads. 
 With a clear shift from exoteric to esoteric practice and intention from the Vedas to 
the Upaniṣadic movement, the Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, a transitional text between the 
Āranyakas and Upaniṣads, presents the intention of text as being very different from the 
Vedas: “Lead me from the unreal to the real. Lead me from darkness to light. Lead me 
from death to immortality” (Prabhavanada and Manchester 93). Long gone is the desire 
to connect with external gods and the need to control the world through ritual. The focus 
is internal, the intention individual, as the goal shifts from attaining prosperity in this 
world and ensuring after-life in svārga to transcending this world through self-realization 
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and thus achieving liberation from the bondage of saṃsāra. It is thus a declaration for the 
quest towards knowledge, truth and liberation. 
 Some stories in the Upaniṣads illustrate a clear break from the authority of 
Brahminism. The following story questions the validity of the caste system as prescribed 
in the Ṛgveda. The significance of this is that as part of the Vedic dharma is questioned, 
it opens the possibility to question the whole of the Veda. In the Chandogya Upaniṣad 
there is the story of a young boy who asks his mother about his caste, as he wants to 
study the Vedas. His mother, who was a servant, tells her son to call himself by his given 
name, clearly stating the irrelevance of his caste. When the boy expresses his desire to 
study the Vedas to a teacher, he is questioned on his caste. The boy repeats what his 
mother told him, to which his teacher responds: “None but a true Brahmin would have 
spoken thus. Go and fetch the fuel, for I will teach you. You have not swerved from the 
truth” (Prabhavanada and Manchester 74–75). And so, the teacher accepts him as a 
student regardless of his non-Brahmin caste. Since caste is determined by birth, not by 
attitude or action, according to this view, acting as a Brahmin could lead to be accepted 
as one, presenting a clear break in tradition. 
 
The Caste System and the Monopoly of the Brahmins 
 Since the concept of caste as it is deeply ingrained in Indian society and religion, 
it is therefore essential in understanding their development. The four basic castes or 
varṇas, directly related to occupation and status, are inherited and permanent. These are 
the Brahmins, or priestly caste, the Kṣatriya, or warrior caste, the Vaiśya, or merchant 
caste and the Śudra, or servant caste (Herman 52). There are also people who do not 
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belong to any caste and are therefore considered to be lower than the Śudras; these as the 
non-caste and the untouchables. Throughout the years many have attempted to abolish 
the caste system, and while it has been possible to create some progress against the 
discrimination of the lower castes, the system itself still stands in India today. The caste 
system is so hard to dissolve mainly because of the fact that it is described in the Vedas 
as part of the dharma, or duty. As it is in the Vedas, and the Vedas are śrūti, as the Vedas 
are considered by many to be absolute truth, so is the concept and implementation of the 
caste system; hence observing the caste system is part of Vedic dharma. 
 The only caste that was allowed to learn and perform the various Vedic rituals 
was the Brahmin caste. Furthermore, only the next two lower castes, the Kṣatriya and 
Vaiśya had access to the rituals through the Brahmins. The Śudra, the non-caste and the 
untouchables were not allowed to be part of the Vedic rituals at all (Herman 52). One of 
the problems this presents, is that a large number of the population had no access to any 
opportunity of prosperity, the other, is that the population that had access to it was forced 
to use the Brahmins as intermediaries. Considering the fact that the household rituals 
were intended for the assurance of prosperity, along with the fact that the Brahmins were 
the only vehicle towards such prosperity, the Brahmins came to be extremely powerful. 
“The religion became power oriented, excessively ritualistic, priest dominated and 
aristocratic” (Herman 63); the Brahmins were no longer just ‘intermediaries’, but rather 
the administrators and proprietors of the religion. 
 The attempt to preserve Brahmanic authority prompts a homogenizing trend in 
India that inspired the work of philosophers such as Vijñānabhikṣu, who “claimed that, 
properly understood, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Vedānta and Nyāya were in essence different 
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aspects of a single, well-coordinated philosophical outlook”, dismissing their abysmal 
differences as a mere “misunderstanding” (Nicholson 3). The Vedic saṃhitas, with the 
designation of śrūti, were of the highest authority since they were considered revelation. 
The authority of the Brahmins, as well as that of the saṃhitas, led to a tendency of 
connecting smṛti works to the philosophy of the Vedas to be perceived as “an 
authoritative addition to the Vedas” in order to elevate the validity of the work (Minor 1). 
Furthermore, the Vedic solution against the perceived threat of the rise of the Upaniṣadic 
movement was to absorb the new movement into the Vedic canon, renaming it Vedānta, 
literally meaning the end of the Veda, hence reducing it to being commentaries on the 
Vedas, as opposed to being a movement in its own right, even though it clearly presents 
an opposingly different philosophy, world-view, purpose, and goal than those of the 
Vedas. 
 
The Six Darśanas Strengthening the Homogeneity Trend 
 The homogenizing trend that arises from the need to reconcile the Vedic tradition 
and the Upaniṣadic movement in order to perpetuate Brahmin authority was further 
continued and strengthened when once again Vedic authority was questioned. “The age 
of the Buddha [563-483BC] represents the great springtide of philosophic spirit in India” 
(Radhakrishnan and Moore 349), as its propositions stimulated a dialogue between the 
many different existing philosophies that continued for centuries, and eventually gave 
rise to Classical Hinduism. As “the conservative schools were compelled to codify their 
views and set forth logical defenses for them, .... all logical attempts to gather the floating 
conceptions of the world into some great general ideas were regarded as darśanas. This 
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conception led to the view that the apparently isolated and independent systems were 
really members of a larger historical plan” (Radhakrishnan and Moore 349). 
 The philosophies that are considered to recognize the validity of the Vedas are 
labeled āstika, or ‘agreer’, and are further categorized within the six Darśanas, or 
‘views’, while those which are considered to not accept the Vedas are labeled as nāstika, 
or ‘denier’, and include Buddhism, Jainism and Cārvāka. Only after the late medieval 
period “it became almost universally accepted that there was a fixed group of Indian 
philosophies in basic agreement with one another and standing together against 
Buddhism and Jainism” (Nicholson 3). The reductionist and absolutistic categorization of 
multiple and widely different philosophies as ‘āstika’ inevitably implies a reference to 
Vedic authority, “falsely suggests a uniformity concerning the importance that was 
placed by Classical Indian philosophers upon one’s attitude to Vedic authority, and 
serves to mask the diversity of philosophical positions within each of the broad religious 
categories” (Burley 2). Since “the acceptance of the Veda implies that all the systems 
have drawn from a common reservoir of thought” (Radhakrishnan and Moore 353), the 
emergence of the six Darśanas further strengthened the homogeneity trend.  
 Causing further problems is the translation of the terms āstika and nāstika as 
orthodox and heterodox, for they have come to be commonly known, in several instances, 
that what they agree with and deny is the existence of God. Therefore, it leads to the 
orthodox systems to be understood as theistic, allowing for the atheism of the unorthodox 
systems. Orthodoxy in this context does not mean the adherence to a particular doctrine 
such as the belief in God, but only focuses on the acceptance of the authority Vedas. 
Furthermore, “atheism in the Indian context does not carry with it irreligiousness. 
 41
Atheism involves disbelief in a Creator, but is quite compatible with belief in salvation... 
Nor is it incompatible with prayer to the gods,” for they are neither creator nor sustainers 
of the universe, and as human beings, bound to the reality of saṃsāra (Smart 23). Thus, 
the concepts of theism and atheism, in their definition and understanding in inevitable 
reference to the Western or Abrahamic concepts of religion, God, creation, and the 
universe, cannot fully apply to Indian systems, for these systems are simply too different. 
 The tendency to attempt to understand Indian religions through the lens of 
Christianity was first established by the early missionaries and the early Orientalists. “To 
the Westerner, however, the Oriental was always like some aspect of the West; he also 
seeks to convert each aspect of Oriental or Occidental life into an unmediated sign of one 
or the other geographical half” (Said 247). Therefore, the many Indian traditions that 
came to define Hinduism were interpreted through their comparison with Christianity, 
and under the constraints of the model the later had already established. This not only led 
to misinterpretations, but also to great generalizations, where single isolated elements 
were taken as the representative of the whole. 
 
Elevating Hinduism as a World Religion 
 The desire to elevate Hinduism as a world religion as a reaction against the negative 
depiction of Hindu traditions by Christian Missionaries during the British colonialism of 
India further strengthens the homogenizing trend. The British Missionaries’ depiction of 
the Hindus as “heathens” with “monstrous and ridiculous” gods, as well as their effort to 
convert and thus save them, prompted the Hindus to begin to present their beliefs in 
foreign terms, portraying Hinduism as a homogenous religion (Pennington 50). 
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Furthermore, the British blamed the source for the inherent immorality of Hinduism, 
fueled by stories of violence, human sacrifice, idolatry, and obscenities, on their 
polytheism (Pennington 82), and hence established their superiority, as Christians, on 
their monotheism. Thus, the negative portrayal of the Hindus by the British Missionaries 
prompted their need to respond by presenting their religion in a cohesive and unified 
way, with one god and one collection of books, founded upon revelation, and as such, 
elevating their religion to the same authority level as the Abrahamic traditions. In time, 
the concept of Hinduism as a single system becomes accepted as it is established as a 
world religion, particularly after Swami Vivekananda’s address in 1893 at the World’s 
Parliament of Religions. 
 Swami Vivekananda is the foremost contributor to the propagation of Vedānta in 
the world. His teachings have had unprecedented effects both in the West and in India. 
By “planting the seeds of independent thinking and in creating a pride in India’s past 
among the youth” (Rajamani 55), his mission elevated Hindu religion and society, having 
a direct impact on the Hindu Renaissance, eventually leading to the independence of 
India. He was able to present Hinduism to a Western audience not only in a way that they 
could understand, but most significantly, in a way they could come to embrace and 
eventually hold as their own. 
  Vivekananda presented Vedānta as ‘the’ Hindu religion (Vivekananda 1:387); a 
universal (Vivekananda 2:375) “religion of non-dual philosophy” (Vivekananda 1:502) 
that could be applied to any religion. In the West he preached monotheism (Vivekananda 
1:331), barely used Sanskrit terminology, de-emphasized cultural remarks and 
furthermore translated concepts into a language adapted for Western Christians: using 
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‘God’ or ‘Father’ instead of Brahman. Philip Goldberg sees this as "a conscious decision 
to emphasize a universal, adaptable Vedānta-yoga", by not openly disclosing beliefs and 
practices that could be perceived "as cultist or idolatrous” (Goldberg 80). In America 
Vivekananda never publicly mentioned the extent of his devotion to his guru and his 
status as an avatar, nor his guru's devotion to the goddess Kālī. His success in this 
endeavor not only opened the doors for other gurus and thinkers, but also created a model 
that many have followed in adapting Eastern teachings for a Western culture. 
 
Conclusion 
 The classification of Patañjali’s Yoga as a Darśana does not come without a series 
of implications and consequences. It implies its affiliation into a cohesive and unified 
system of thought, its allegiance to the authority of the Vedas, and it defines itself as 
distinct from those who are not considered āstika, drawing an alleged clear demarcation 
between itself and the nāstikas, when in reality, in many ways, “Yoga holds closer 
affinity with Jainism and Buddhism than with its Vedānta and Bhakti cousins” (Chapple, 
Yoga and the Luminous ix). Furthermore, its frequent paring with the system of Classical 
Sāṃkhya, it allows for īśvara as the main distinction between the two systems, labeling 
the former as saiśvara and the later nīrīśvara, which are often translated as theistic and 
atheistic, terms that come to misrepresent both systems.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE ETYMOLOGY OF THE TERM ĪŚVARA AND ITS PRE-CLASSICAL HISTORY 
 
 The categorization of Classical Yoga as a theistic text is directly rooted in the 
consequences of the presence of the term īśvara in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra. Chapter 2 
addresses the consequences that arise from certain prevalent hermeneutical trends that 
have led to the theistic interpretation of the term and the concomitant translation of īśvara 
as God. Furthermore, it reviews the commentarial tradition of Classical Yoga as well as 
the elevation of certain commentaries to be as authoritative, and in some instances, more 
authoritative than the original text, further perpetuating such misconceptions. Chapter 3 
further expands on the nature of these trends, identifying them as consequences of an 
indigenous homogenizing trend that arose as a method to perpetuate Vedic authority and 
was perpetuated in order to elevate Hinduism as a world religion.  
 The third problem mentioned in Chapter 1 is the ambiguity of the term īśvara, for it 
has been used throughout history in different contexts and thus conveyed different 
meanings. However, the discrepancies in the understanding and application of the term 
are not exclusive to its use in different periods of time, but also prevalent in systems that 
are contemporary to each other. “Each system sets forth its special doctrine by using, 
with necessary modifications, the current language of the highest religious speculation” 
(Radhakrishnan and Moore 353). Hence, the different systems have used the most 
common philosophical terms, however, they do not necessarily use them with the same 
understanding, meaning, or in the same context. In order to demystify the term īśvara, 
Chapter 4 is an analysis of its etymology, primarily focusing on its pre-Classical history 
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and development. Since in many cases the translation of īśvara as God is almost 
automatic, Chapter 4 is an exploration of the meaning of the term, tracing its 
development as far back as possible, from its secular origins and its transition from 
worldly lord to personal God. Further, it explores the concept of theism in Indian 
systems, its connection to the development of the term, and the Abrahamic influence on 
the interpretation and thus translation of Hindu terms. 
 In order to address the issue of terminology, an important distinction needs to be 
made between the following categories: (1) Functional deities, such as the Vedic gods 
Indra, Agni, Varuṇa, etc., who are individual, particular, and related to a specific aspect 
or activity of the universe. (2) Sectarian traditions, such as those focused on the worship 
of Viṣṇu or Śiva, which have specific beliefs that are unique to their respective traditions, 
and that may vary from one tradition to another. (3) Widespread doctrines, such as the 
concepts of karma or mokṣa, which are concepts that have been generally accepted by the 
different Hindu traditions, whether they necessarily adhere to them or not. The 
development of the term īśvara will be traced from its Vedic origins, addressing the 
different stages in the understanding of the term and its use by different texts and systems 
of thought, as well as placing the term in the context of these three categories, and how 
these relate to theism in the development of Hindu thought. 
 The current most popular use of the term īśvara in Hindu thought is “in the sense of 
‘omnific, omnipresent Supreme God’. Excepting the sectarian words like ‘Śiva’, ‘Viṣṇu’, 
‘Rāma’, ‘Kṛṣṇa’, there is probably no other non-sectarian word which is so commonly 
used among the Hindus for the idea of God, as the word ‘īśvara’ (or ‘Parameśvara’)”  
(Shastri 487). However, the concept of Parameśvara in this sense did not exist until after 
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the time of the Buddha (Shastri 498). This is precisely the position of M. D. Shastri, as he 
argues that, if the concept of īśvara in the sense of Parameśvara, a supreme and only 
creator God, had been established in India at the time of the Buddha, “the rise and great 
expansion of a godless system like Buddhism” would have been unattainable (Shastri 
502). 
 
Secular Origins of the Term Īśvara 
 Examples of the secular origin of the term īśvara can be seen in the Aṣṭadhyāyī of 
Pāṇini, the most authoritative work on Classical Sanskrit and the Mahābhāṣya of 
Patañjali (the grammarian), the great commentary on the former. In both cases the term 
“has been consistently used ... in the sense of a rājā or an administrative head” (Shastri 
487). Furthermore, in the Mahābhāṣya “the words ‘rājā’, ‘ina’, and ‘īśvara’ are clearly 
regarded as synonyms and king Puṣyamitra is spoken of as ‘īśvara’” (Shastri 492), which 
clearly demonstrates the secular use of the term. Considering that Pāṇini’s Aṣṭadhyāyī 
“has been placed in the 5th century BCE by some and in the 4th century BCE by others” 
(Joshi 14), it would make the Aṣṭadhyāyī contemporary to the time of the Buddha, as well 
as to at least some Upaniṣads, for the oldest are considered to be dated by Dāsgupta and 
Müller between the 6th and 5th century BCE (Joshi 13), and the earliest at around the 2nd 
century BCE (Pflueger 4771). The Mahābhāṣya however is considered to be dated 
around the 2nd century BCE, therefore, at least until that time, there was no widespread 
understanding of īśvara in the sense of Parameśvara. 
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Īśvara in the Vedas, Brāhmanas, and Upaniṣads 
 The term īśvara first begins to be used in the Atharaveda, the youngest of the Vedic 
saṃhitas, in five passages; however, it is not used in the sense of Parameśvara, as it is 
“used only in the ordinary sense of a lord or master” (Shastri 489). In the Ṛgveda, the 
term does not appear at all, and only uses “the epithets īśāna or īśā (from the same root) 
to designate the power of such deities as the universal sovereign Varuṇa, guardian of the 
cosmic order; Agni, the god of fire; Indra, lightning-hurling leader of the gods; and 
Puruṣa, the Cosmic Person” (Pflueger 4751).  The term īśāna, a noun meaning 
“possessing, wealthy, reigning” and in its masculine form as ”a ruler” or “master” 
(Monier Williams 171) appears “in the Ṛgveda in the sense of ‘a ruler’ and is generally 
used for Indra and other gods” (Shastri 488). Furthermore, none of all these functional 
deities represent a highest God, since none of them seems to be consistently above the 
rest. Additionally, as illustrated in Chapter 3, the Ṛgveda takes a rather agnostic position 
regarding the nature of the creator of the universe, and further states the many deities are 
not the creators, for they were created after creation took place. 
 Throughout the Brāhmanas the god Prajāpati is elevated “as the embodiment of 
Vedic sacrifice” and begins to be connected to the Absolute Brahman (Pflueger 4751). 
However, the suffix pati in Prajāpati is another word that has been used in earlier times 
in the sense of a lord which did not become as widespread as the terms derived from īś 
(Gonda 133). In the ten older Upaniṣads, the term īśvara “not only has not been used in 
the sense of Parameśvara, but also, excepting the Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, it has not 
been used at all”, the latter in which it is used in the sense of “capable of” (Shastri 494). 
The importance of the concept of Brahman arises in the Upaniṣads; however, it cannot be 
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equated to the later understanding of Parameśvara, for the Vedāntic concept of Brahman 
does not imply an external worship of an external entity or being, as is the case with the 
devotional understanding of Parameśvara. In the Upaniṣads Brahman emerges as the 
Absolute; it is the subtle and the concrete, the big and the small, the in and the out, the 
Self and the Absolute. 
 In the Upaniṣads, the ātman, or Self, is seen as the microcosm of Brahman. While 
ātman is often times translated as soul, this is not the understanding that the Self is 
individual and particular of the person who embodies it. The misunderstanding that arises 
in the interpretation of Vedāntic doctrine from later devotional practices has led to the 
understanding that the Self searches to merge with Brahman. However, this is not the 
case, as the Self is not considered to be separate from Brahman, for Brahman and the Self 
are one and the same. The cognitive error in this case is due to the perception that they 
are separate, thus, the solution, and hence the goal of the system is the realization that the 
separation is an illusion; there is no merging, for they have always been one. 
Furthermore, Brahman was never really perceived as a popular deity: “The very fact that 
it is conceived in neuter gender shows that it can never be the object of popular worship. 
The god of popular worship is always conceived in masculine or feminine gender” 
(Shastri 497).  
 The Kaṭha Upaniṣad describes the eternal qualities of Brahman in terms of the Self, 
illustrating their homogeny. Furthermore, it clearly states that Brahman “is neither the 
cause nor effect”, for it is the Absolute, which is outside the Western understanding of 
God.  
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It is – Oṃ. This syllable is Brahman. … The Self, whose symbol is Oṃ, is the 
omniscient Lord. He is not born. He does not die. He is neither cause nor effect. 
This Ancient One in unborn, imperishable, eternal: though the body be destroyed, 
he is not killed (Prabhavanada and Manchester 8).  
 
From Worldly Lord to Parameśvara 
 The transition of the understanding of īśvara from worldly lord to the sense of 
Parameśvara begins with the rise of sectarian traditions as Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism, 
“which were occasioned by [the rise of] Buddhism” (Phillips 111). As a reaction to the 
Buddhist worship traditions that began after the death of the Buddha, the Brahmin trend 
of appropriating doctrines into their tradition in order to maintain their popularity and 
authority extended to them giving “prominence to the gods, Viṣṇu and Śiva” and 
“clustered around them in Epics and Purāṇas” (Phillips 46). It is only when the term 
īśāna begins to be identified as “a synonym of Śiva” that the transition of the term īśvara 
towards Parameśvara begins. “In the Śvetāśvatara and other older Śaiva Upaniṣads 
‘Maheśvara’ and not ‘īśvara’ has been used for Śiva ... but gradually in the Śaivaite 
literature itself ‘īśvara’ came to be used for ‘Maheśvara’”, and later in the tantras the 
term īśvara is used as a synonym of Śiva (Shastri 501). 
 The path of devotion, or bhakti, that arose in sectarian traditions and “percolated 
throughout India by the medieval period” (Siegel 422) “continues in the sectarian 
literature of the epics and Purāṇas, becoming from the medieval period to modern times 
the mainstream of Hindu spirituality” (Pflueger 4752). The devotional and thus exoteric 
understanding of īśvara in the sense of Parameśvara could not have become widespread 
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until as early as the medieval period. As devotional traditions become increasingly 
popular it became necessary, in order to legitimize the devotional approach, to reconcile 
them with the most prominent āstika systems, and thus connect them to Vedic authority. 
The need for reconciliation gave rise to a syncretic trend that has been perpetuated and 
popularized until contemporary times, its most prominent exponent being Vijñānabhikṣu, 
who “was active at a time when, on the one hand, in the philosophical field, Vedānta was 
at its height and on the other hand, in the religious field, Bhakti was gaining supremacy” 
(Rukmani, “Vijñānabhikṣu: A Maverick Philosopher” 8). 
 In his Yogavārttika Vijñānabhikṣu not only presents īśvara in the sense of 
Parameśvara as the efficient cause of the universe (Rukmani, “Vijñānabhikṣu: A 
Maverick Philosopher” 133), but he further considers īśvara to be able to “bring about 
quickly asaṃprajñāta-yoga and kaivalya for the devotee who practices bhakti” 
(Rukmani, “Vijñānabhikṣu: A Maverick Philosopher” 135), thus irrevocably redefining 
kaivalya in terms of its dependency on īśvara, thus elevating the devotional path. This 
understanding of īśvara is perpetuated by later commentaries such as Dasgupta’s, as he 
not only considers devotion of īśvara to be “the easiest course of attaining samādhi”, but 
he states that “by his grace he removes all obstructions” (Dasgupta, Yoga as Philosophy 
and Religion 161), making īśvara an active agent in the path of the yogi towards kaivalya 
and thus elevating the role of īśvara in the path of Yoga even further. All of these 
understandings prove as a series of misplaced assumptions regarding Patañjali’s Yoga 
system. 
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Theism and Atheism in Indian Thought 
 The bhakti tradition became increasingly widespread throughout India over time, 
and in the process, it intermingled with other prominent traditions, lead the masses to 
adopt a devotional approach towards several other sectarian traditions.  This Hindu 
devotional approach, however, cannot be necessarily understood as theism in the same 
sense as the Abrahamic traditions. The following passage is a description of the syncretic 
approach common to Hindu practitioners as well as the incompatibility of Hindu thought 
with theism:  
My own teacher in India is a devotee of Kṛṣṇa; he also practices Yoga, makes 
offerings to Agni, Gaṇeśa, Sarasvatī, and the lot, and without any feeling of 
contradiction speaks of saṃsāra as Brahman. He is, I believe, typical of Indian 
teachers when he asserts that there is really no difference between Śaṅkara and 
Rāmānuja, between Śiva and Viṣṇu, between tantra and bhakti. Is he a theist? I 
would not dare ask him for the same reason that I would not dare wonder if Indian 
thinking is theistic (Siegel 420). 
 Theism, as stated previously, implies the belief in an entity who is the creator and 
sustainer of the universe, all-powerful, all knowing; “a god who is only one, only 
external, only distinct from his creation” (Siegel 420), which is not in line with Indian 
understandings of deity or creation. Furthermore, the concept of karma would make a 
complete contradiction to the Western concept of God, for in most Indian systems, karma 
has more power in affecting people’s destinies than God, for the laws of karma cannot be 
broken, even by the most powerful deity (Garbe, “Outlines of a History of Indian 
Philosophy” 585). Since in India “God can be one and many, external and internal, even 
 52
real and unreal” (Siegel 420), it is obvious that this understanding of God is completely 
different from the concept of God in the Abrahamic religions, therefore, the term theism 
would not accurately represent the complexity of the Hindu concept of deity, as it would 
be greatly misleading. In this line, the use of the term theism in Hindu thought would thus 
define the systems that do not adhere to the same beliefs as atheistic, leading to further 
misrepresentation and confusion, for the concept of atheism is vastly different in Hindu 
thought from Western thought. “Atheism in the Indian context does not carry with it 
irreligiousness. Atheism involves disbelief in a Creator, but is quite compatible with 
belief in salvation, ... [and] with prayer to the gods, conceived as beings who are inside, 
rather than transcendent to, the empirical cosmos” (Smart 23). 
 
Conclusion 
 The development of the use of the term īśvara is thus parallel to the development of 
the devotional approach in Hindu thought. The concept of creation takes an agnostic 
approach in the Vedas, with the appearance of functional and utilitarian deities yet no 
definite concept of creator or ultimate single sustainer of the universe. The concept of 
Brahman emerges as the Absolute during the Upaniṣads, which in time begins to be tied 
with sectarian devotional traditions that spread throughout India during the medieval 
period, giving rise to a pseudo-theism that has become a widespread doctrine of Modern 
Hinduism.  
 The term īśvara developed from the terms īśā and īśāna, which share the same 
verbal root, used in the earlier Vedas, while īśvara itself was not used until the latest of 
the Vedic Saṃhitas. However, none of these terms were used in the sense of 
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Parameśvara, but rather in the sense of a worldly lord, which was a customary address 
for the many functional deities. The term was used as well in completely secular 
environments and contexts, as is the case with the Aṣṭadhyāyī of Pāṇini and the 
Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali in the sense of rājā as an address to kings and worldly lords. 
Only when connected to Śaivism, which was a sectarian traditions at that time, does it 
begin to be used in the sense of Parameśvara, and only after the popularization of bhakti 
leading to the devotional approach to many other systems of thought becoming 
widespread does it not begin to be translated as God. This translation is further 
perpetuated in the face of Muslim and subsequent British invasions, as an attempt to 
legitimize the Hindu religion (Pennington 3). 
 In spite of the many efforts to elevate Hinduism as a world religion through 
attempting to filter and translate it into Abrahamic terms, Hindu traditions can and should 
be understood for what they truly are. Hence, this study proposes, in order to avoid 
further misunderstandings and confusion, that terms which are irrevocably tied to 
Abrahamic traditions not be used as suitable translations for Hindu terms, such as God or 
Lord for īśvara. The former has been established throughout the present study as 
misleading for several reasons, and the later has contributed to the understanding of 
īśvara as God due to its common use in Christian literature and popular parlance to 
denote God. Rather, it would lead to increased accuracy to retain the terms in their 
original Sanskrit, in the same way this has been done with terms such as Yoga, karma, 
and guru, so much so, that they have already become part of common parlance in the 
West.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE PATH OF CLASSICAL YOGA: READING PATAÑJALI WITHOUT 
COMMENTARY 
 
 It has been previously stated that the frequent translation of the term īśvara as God 
presents several problems: (1) it does not accurately represent the intent of the use and 
purpose of the term īśvara as used in the Yogasūtra, specifically obscuring the 
interpretation of īśvarapraṇidhāna, a functional aspect of the system. (2) It has directly 
led to the common understanding of the main distinction between Sāṃkhya and Yoga as 
the former being atheistic while the latter theistic, labels that come to misrepresent both 
systems. (3) It allows for the confusion regarding the path of Patañjali, obscuring this 
path of discrimination, separation, involution and isolation towards liberation, to a point 
where it can lend itself to be interpreted and accommodated to fit into other ideologies, 
thus enabling a syncretic trend that has led to the popular understanding of Yoga as 
‘union with the divine’. In order to address these issues most accurately, and particularly 
due to the ambiguity of the term as well as the inability to decipher with certainty the 
intention behind Patañjali’s use of this term, it becomes imperative to understand its 
nature and functionality within the constraints of the original text.  
 Hence, Chapter 5 is the product of a grammatical analysis of the Yogasūtra of 
Patañjali  (starting on page 70) without relying on the interpretations presented by 
commentary, and the particular translation and interpretation of the text that arises from 
it. It focuses on the sūtras that are most relevant in describing the path proposed by 
Patañjali, as well as the sūtras that most illustrate the nature and functionality of the term 
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īśvara. It is thus both a narrative of the path proposed by Patañjali, strictly based on the 
original text, as well as an analysis of the identity, purpose and use of the term īśvara and 
the functionality of the concept of īśvarapraṇidhāna within the Yogasūtra, and how these 
two relate to his proposed path as a whole, in order to clarify the aforementioned points. 
 
The Ontology of Classical Sāṃkhya 
 The ontology of Classical Yoga, as that of Classical Sāṃkhya (Sāṃkhyakārikā), is 
based on a dualistic model of “subject and object and which maintains that the 
fundamental error consists in their confusion or identification in any form or at any level” 
(Krishna 202). Sāṃkhya philosophy describes the universe to be made up of only two 
independent elements: puruṣa and prakṛti, which “are thus two ultimate, eternal and 
independent principles of existence. Puruṣas are many, prakṛti is one” (Tiamni 189). 
Patañjali makes very clear that these two elements exist independent from each other, as 
well as the fact that there is not one puruṣa or transcendental reality but rather a multitude 
of puruṣas or seers, and only one universal reality of nature, or prakṛti.  This is illustrated 
in sūtra II.22, where he explains that even though the perception or experience of prakṛti 
ceases to exist as such for the seer who has accomplished the aim of the path, prakṛti 
itself does not, due to its universal nature, and to the multiplicity of puruṣas. 
 Parkṛti is everything material, even in its most subtle forms, consisting of elements 
and sense organs, the latter that include the mind and thought processes, which are for the 
sake of puruṣa’s experience and transcendence. Having the character of brightness 
(sattva), action (rajas), and inertia (tamas), these are further defined as its primary 
constituents, or guṇas (see YSII.1). It is the seen, or dṛśya, which only has the quality of 
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being seen, but not the ability to see. Puruṣa is everything that prakṛti is not. In contrast, 
it is the seer, or draṣṭṛ, that which only has the ability of seeing, but not the quality of 
being seen (see YSII.20). Due to their opposite characteristics they attract each other and 
interact, the purpose of that connection (samyoga) being the cultivation of the perception 
of the own nature (svarūpa) of the power (śakti) of both puruṣa (the owner) and prakṛti 
(the owned) (see YSII.23). Furthermore, the existence of prakṛti (the seen) is strictly for 
the purpose of puruṣa (the seer) (see YSII.21), in order for it to become established in its 
own nature (svarūpa) (see YSI.3), and thus achieving a state of Yoga (see YSI.2). 
 In a way, prakṛti, like a body of water, becomes the mirror for puruṣa to see its 
reflection upon, which, due to its exclusive nature of seer, is unable to do on its own. In 
that process, puruṣa becomes so identified with its reflection, that it loses its identity 
completely as it becomes absorbed in its own reflection. This misperception (viparyaya) 
is identified by Patañjali as one of the five-fold fluctuations (vṛttayaḥ pañcatayyaḥ) of the 
mind (see YSI.5), which is the mistaken knowledge  (mithyāñjānam) on the foundation of 
an appearance that is not what it appears to be (see YSI.8). Hence, the main cognitive 
problem arises when, in the process of this interaction, which is supposed to illuminate 
the nature of both puruṣa and prakṛti independently, puruṣa’s misidentification with 
prakṛti leads to puruṣa to lose the awareness of its own identity. Patañjali describes this 
misidentification as avidyā, or ignorance (see YSII.24), and only through its destruction 
(abhāva), and thus the dissolution of that connection (saṃyoga) between puruṣa and 
prakṛti, can the isolation of seeing (kaivalya) be achieved, which is the goal, ergo the 
end, of the path (see YSII.25).  
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The Path of Patañjala Yoga 
 This isolation or abstraction of seeing (kaivalya) is the return to the original state 
(pratiprasava) of the primary constituents of nature (guṇas), devoid of purpose for 
puruṣa (arthaśūnyānām), as well as the grounding (pratiṣṭhā) of puruṣa in its own nature 
(svarūpa) by this cultivated power of awareness (citiśakti) (see YSIV.34). Thus, the 
attainment of kaivalya is often times interpreted as liberation; however, while it is very 
appropriate to interpret it as such in terms of puruṣa having transcended its cognitive 
bond with prakṛti, this does not necessarily imply any type of salvation or release from 
saṃsāra, or mokṣa. Patañjali, in fact, ends his fourth and final chapter with this previous 
sūtra (YSIV.34), and fails to elucidate further on what happens to the liberated puruṣa 
once kaivalya is attained. It appears that Patañjali describes kaivalya exclusively in terms 
of prakṛti, as this is the realm where the practice takes place. Once transcended, perhaps 
it becomes impossible to describe its puruṣa experience or reality in prakṛtic terms. 
 The solution Patañjali proposes, is that since a connection between puruṣa and 
prakṛti has been established, puruṣa can use its transient prakṛtic vehicle (body and 
mind) as a tool to follow a path of involution back towards the abstraction of puruṣa’s 
nature, until that connection completely dissolves, and puruṣa can stand in its own nature 
(svarūpa) in a state of kaivalya. While Samādhipāda, the first chapter, describes the path 
in terms of samādhi, or mental concentration or absorption, Sādhanapāda, the second 
chapter, describes it more in terms of practice. Throughout the text, several techniques 
are discussed, in order to address the many different practitioners, with their different 
temperaments, who are in different stages of the path. At the beginning of the text, 
Patañjali defines Yoga as the restriction (nirodha) of the fluctuations of the mind 
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(cittavrṛtti) (see YSI.2), further describing the path and some of the techniques in terms 
of this definition. Further, he defines the result of the practice of Yoga as the 
establishment, or rather remaining (avasthānam), of the seer (drṣṭu) in its own nature (see 
YSI.3), and the failure of achievement (itaratra), as the identification with those 
fluctuations (see YSI.4).   
 The first means towards the cessation of the fluctuations of the mind to achieve the 
goal of Yoga (YSI.2-3) is practice (abhyāsa) and dispassion (vairagya) (see YSI.12). 
From this definition, Patañjali begins to describe the different levels of commitment and 
intensity of practice and dispassion, as them being weak (mṛdu), intermediate (madhya), 
and intense (adhimātra) (see YSI.22). While he describes dispassion as the conception 
(samjñā) of the mastery (vaśīkāra) of being free from desire of that which is seen or 
heard (see YSI.15), the highest form of dispassion is the lack of desire for the 
constituents of nature (guṇa), or the non-attachment to prakṛti (YSI.16). In the same way, 
in order for practice to become grounded (bhūmi), it must be cultivated with reverence 
(satkāra), uninterruptedly (nairantarya), and for a long time (dīrgakāla) (see YSI.14). 
For those who have this highest level of commitment in their practice leading to its full 
establishment, and thus an intense desire of emancipation (tīvrasamvega), the goal of 
Yoga is near (see YSI.21). However, for those who do not, there are a series of 
alternatives, which are denoted by the word ‘or’ (vā).  
 
Īśvarapraṇidhāna as Concept and Method 
 The first alternative he mentions is īśvarapraṇidhāna (YSI.23), after which he 
dedicated the following six sūtras (YSI.24-29) to elucidate on that technique, defining its 
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nature and its effects. After listing the obstacles (antarāya) (YSI.30-31), he prescribes the 
way to transcend them as the practice of a single reality (ekatattva) (see YSI.32), 
followed by the other alternative techniques: the retention of breath (YSI.34), the 
cognition of a sensory object that creates steadiness of mind (YSI.35), by engaging in 
activities that are sorrowless and illuminating (YSI.36), by directing the mind towards 
objects in order to transcend attachment (YSI.37), by cultivating knowledge in dreams 
and sleep (YSI.38), or, through dhyāna, meditation (YSI.39). The sequence of these 
seven alternatives to the intense commitment to practice and dispassion seem to follow a 
pattern of internalization, from the most external and concrete, the retention of breath, to 
the most internal and abstract, dhyāna. Therefore, at least in this chapter, 
īśvarapraṇidhāna appears to function as a starting point towards the process of 
internalization, leading to meditation (dhyāna). 
 However, this is not the only place in the text where īśvarapraṇidhāna is 
mentioned.  While in Samādhipāda īśvarapraṇidhāna seems to be but on of several 
methods or approaches, in Sādhanapāda, the second chapter, it appears as one of the 
three elements of Kriyāyoga, which is itself contained in the Niyamas, one of the 
elements of Aṣṭaṅga Yoga. Sādhanapāda in fact opens with the introduction of 
Kriyāyoga, perhaps establishing its practice as an entry point to the techniques to follow, 
and defining it as being composed of three components: tapas, svādhyāya, and 
īśvarapraṇidhāna (see YSII.1). Further, it defines the purpose of its practice as leading 
towards the cultivation of samādhi and the attenuation of the afflictions or kleśa (YSII.2) 
(afflictions defined in YSII.3-10), and states the ultimate method for the eradication of 
the fluctuations (vṛttaya) arising from such afflictions to be dhyāna, or meditation (see 
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YSII.11). Further along the text, Patañjali introduces the concept of Aṣṭaṅga Yoga, or the 
Eightfold Path of Yoga, as being for the cultivation of discernment (vivekakhyāti) 
(YSII.28). Kriyāyoga appears here again, contained within the second component of the 
path, Niyama, or restraints, along with two more components, purity (śauca) and 
contentment (santoṣa) (see YSII.32). Here, he elaborates on the components of 
Kriyāyoga: Tapas, or austerity, is the destruction of impurities, the perfection of the body 
(kāya) and sense organs (indriya) (see YSII.43), svādhyāya, or self study, is the means 
for a connection (samprayoga) 20  to a chosen deity (iṣṭadevatā) (see YSII.44), and 
īśvarapraṇidhāna, the means for the perfection (siddhi) of samādhi (see IYSI.45). 
 Up to this point, īśvarapraṇidhāna has been mentioned in two different chapters: in 
the first chapter as perhaps an optional method, and in the second chapter, as more of a 
foundational method of this path; however, wherever īśvarapraṇidhāna is mentioned, or 
whatever it is connected to, in all cases it leads to samādhi, specifically through dhyāna, 
or meditation. The term praṇidhāna can mean ‘attention’, ‘vehement desire’, ‘abstract 
contemplation’, ‘fixing’, or ‘vow’. However, in order to reach the most accurate 
translation of this word, it is necessary to trace the formation of the word praṇidhāna to 
its smallest components: ‘pra + ni + dhā + na’. The verbal root √dhā means ‘placing’, 
‘putting’, or, ‘holding’, ‘possessing’, ‘having’. When combined with the suffix ‘na’ it 
                                                        
20 Note the difference between Patañjali’s choice of term here for the connection between a yogi and his 
iṣṭadevatā, and the term used for the connection between puruṣa and prakṛti. In the former, he uses the 
term samprayoga, while in the latter, samyoga. The words are identical except for the prefix ‘pra’ in the 
former. This can be understood as a deliberate choice by Patañjali in order to make a distinction between 
these two different types of connection. While the yogi requires action and effort (denoted by ‘pra’) in 
order to connect to its own concept of deity as part of a method towards concentration and thus 
internalization, the puruṣa does not strive to connect with prakṛti, and thus, this connection can be 
understood as an unintended misidentification. 
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comes to mean ‘containing’, ‘holding’, ‘receptacle’, or ‘case’. So far, it can mean either 
‘placing’ or ‘holding’ something somewhere, however, there is still the contribution of 
the prefixes ‘pra’ and ‘ni’ in this construction to consider. The prefix ‘pra’ as an adverb 
means ‘forward’, or ‘forth’, and as an adjective, ‘like’, or ‘resembling’. First of all, 
whether in use as an adverb or adjective, ‘pra’ denotes an action, something that is 
performed. Adding the adverb ‘ni’, which can mean ‘in’, ‘into’, or ‘within’, adds yet 
another dimension to its meaning. Thus, when combined with the term īśvara, 
praṇidhāna can be interpreted as the action of placing or holding forth into īśvara, or 
resembling what is contained or that which resides within īśvara, the essence of īśvara.  
 
The Identity and Use of Īśvara in the Yogasūtra 
 After the introduction of īśvarapraṇidhāna, Patañjali describes īśvara as a special 
or distinct (viśeṣa) puruṣa, its distinction resting on the fact that he is untouched by the 
accumulations of karma that arise from afflictions (kleśa) (see YSI.24), and in which the 
omniscient (sarvajña) seed (bīja) is unsurpassed (niratiśaya) (see YSI.25), as he is the 
teacher (guru) of the ancestors (pūrveṣam) from not being limited (ānāvacchedāt) by 
time (kāla) (see YSI.26). The fact that īśvara is deemed a puruṣa means he is not outside 
the Sāṃkhya-Yoga model of duality, therefore, as a puruṣa, he is by definition a seer, a 
witness of the seen, or prakṛti, and hence unable to interact with prakṛti in a way in 
which he could have any effect or influence upon it. From Patañjali’s definition, īśvara 
appears to be a representative of the highest ideal of the path, rather than an external 
deity, and certainly, much different from a creator or sustainer God. Thus, by having 
included a definition of īśvara that contradicts the popular theistic meaning of the term, 
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presents a possible deliberate intention of Patañjali to separate his use of the term from its 
use by other systems of thought or traditions (see Chapter 4 for the pre-classical history 
of the term īśvara).   
  Upon defining the identity of īśvara, Patañjali proceeds to explain the method of 
īśvarapraṇidhāna, as the recitation (japa) of the praṇava (oṃ), īśvara’s sound (see 
YSI.27), which leads to the nature (artha) of essence or meditation (bhāvanā) (see 
YSI.28). This chanting or repetition (japa) of the praṇava (oṃ) serves a dual purpose. On 
the one hand, it is an abstract or vibrational representation of an ideal reality (īśvara), and 
on the other, it is a tool in this process of internalization, standing as a link, through 
action (chanting), between the conceptual īśvara and the fully internalized experience of 
transcendence. By being used as a point of focus, going beyond the identity of īśvara in 
worldly terms, using the praṇava as an abstract representation of the archetype of the 
ultimate reality, through a process of internalization, from the japa or repetition, which 
represents a gross element or reality, to bhāvanā or essence/meditation, which represents 
a subtle or abstract element or reality, thus emerging as a deep empirical experience in 
the realm of meditation. As a result, the recitation of oṃ allows the yogi to have an 
experience beyond body and mind, beyond prakṛti: an experience of puruṣa itself. 
Meditating on īśvara, who is a puruṣa that has never lost its identity to prakṛti, the 
pragmatic approach of Yoga allows the puruṣa to use īśvara as an alternate mirror, so to 
speak, in the process of bringing awareness back to an internal and subtle place, and 
eventually back to its true nature (svarūpa). 
 As far as Kriyāyoga, if Niyama is understood as a restraint, the question arises, 
what is it restraining? Patañjali defines the path of Aṣṭaṅgayoga to be for the purpose of 
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the cultivation of discernment, or vivekakhyāti, of the own identity of puruṣa from its 
misidentification with prakṛti  (YSII.28). The Niyama elements additional to Kriyāyoga, 
śauca and santoṣa, establish a desire to protect one’s body (svāṅgajugupsā) (YSII.40), a 
mastery (jaya) of the sense organs, one-pointedness (aikāgrya) and right understanding 
(saumanasya) (YSII.41), as well as unsurpassed (anuttama) happiness (sukha) (YSII.42). 
These are further combined with the results from the practice of Kriyāyoga: the 
destruction of impurities and the perfection of the body and sense organs through tapas 
(see YSII.43), the connection to a chosen deity (iṣṭadevatā) through svādhyāya (see 
YSII.44), and the practice of īśvarapraṇidhāna as the means for the perfection of 
samādhi (see YSII.45). Clearly, the nature of these methods restrain the mind from 
engaging in further misidentifications, and hence in activities that lead away from the 
achievement of discernment (vivekakhyāti), as they support a self-centered, inward-
minded approach. Even in the case of the use of iṣṭadevatā through svādhyāya, since this 
is followed by īśvarapraṇidhāna, it can be understood as an external point of focus in 
order to achieve one-pointedness (aikāgrya), and to be fully internalized through the 
practice of īśvarapraṇidhāna in order to cultivate right understanding (saumanasya).  
 Through the practice of īśvarapraṇidhāna, the yogi attempts to establish a 
connection with īśvara, yet īśvara here is not an external element or deity to worship, but 
rather a direct experience of puruṣa, where the yogi is able to get a direct glimpse of its 
true nature. In contrast, the concept of iṣṭadevatā, presented by Patañjali as an element of 
svādhyāya, or self study, would function as an external deity, yet still, not one to worship 
particularly, but rather one to establish a connection or identification with (samprayoga) 
for the purpose of self study (see YSII.44). In this context, it seems the role of īśvara is 
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described as a tool in the process of internalization necessary to fulfill this goal. If truth is 
to be defined as the closest approximation to a particular ultimate reality, in this sense, 
īśvara is proposed to be an archetype of this ultimate or rather ideal reality, which 
attainment is the goal of Yoga. The attainment of this reality does not imply going 
anywhere or merging with anything external, but rather realizing one’s own nature. Thus, 
praṇidhāna becomes more of a concept that aids in a process of internalization, or a 
transference of identity of the essence of īśvara with that of the yogi, which are the same 
in nature, puruṣa, rather than a seeking to attempt an external union or devotion. 
 
Classical Yoga vs. Vedānta 
 From the present analysis, it thus becomes evident that the many common syncretic 
trends between Classical Yoga with other systems of thought, particularly those that lead 
to the popular understanding of Yoga as ‘union with the divine’, are nothing more than a 
misplaced reconciliation attempt, based on assumptions and interpretations that are in 
fundamental contradiction with the original text. The path Vedānta proposes is 
immensely different from that of Patañjali, as the nature of the cognitive error, as well as 
the solution, are completely opposing concepts. In contrast with Classical Yoga and 
Sāṃkhya, in the Upaniṣads there is only one element in the universe: Brahman; 
“incomprehensible, for it cannot be comprehended; un-decaying, for it never decays; 
unattached, for it never attaches itself; unfettered, for it is never bound” (Prabhavanada 
and Manchester 127). It is the subtle and the concrete, the big and the small, the in and 
the out, the Self and the Absolute. The ātman, or Self, is seen as the microcosm of 
Brahman and not as a separate entity; therefore, Brahman and ātman are precisely one 
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and the same. As in Classical Yoga, the error is due to avidyā, however, in Vedānta, the 
nature of this error is not due to a coming together, but rather a coming apart, when the 
ātman forgets its Brahmanic nature, as the fact that it and Brahman are one and the same. 
 If Vedānta were to be translated into Sāṃkhyan terms, it could be said that there is 
only puruṣa, which is only one, and the illusion lies in perceiving prakṛti as real as well 
as the separation between the many puruṣas as real. Realization then comes in realizing 
this illusion and uniting the seemingly separate and individual puruṣa with the one 
puruṣa that is eternally divine (Brahman).  Since Sāṃkhya presents a dualistic model and 
Vedānta a non-dualistic model, the solution for the error in both systems is fundamentally 
different, thus their approaches towards liberation, completely opposite. ‘Yoga’, as a 
vehicle of correcting this primordial error, etymologically derives from the Sanskrit verb 
root ‘yuj’, meaning to yoke, can be defined as either joining or harnessing. In this light, 
while the term joining applies to Vedānta, the term harnessing would definitely be much 
more appropriate for Patañjali’s Yoga. Therefore, “the fact that some interpreters have 
tried to read into them [Sāṃkhyakārikā and Yogasūtra] both theism and Vedāntism... [is] 
a violation of the spirit of Sāṃkhya as a distinctive philosophical position” (Krishna 198). 
 Īśvarapraṇidhāna as an external concept can be seen as a vehicle towards a process 
of abstraction that leads to the deep internalization of an experience of an ideal reality. If 
one mistakenly perceives the path as the goal, getting stuck on the vehicle rather than 
pursuing the destination, the destination will never be reached. Thus, the conception of 
connection with or worship of īśvara as the goal of Yoga would create a situation in 
which the path is mistaken for the goal, staying in the realm of devotion and eternally 
waiting to receive mokṣa from īśvara, getting lost in the misidentification of the self with 
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the path, creating attachment, and hence completely loosing the experiential nature of this 
path. Much like learning how to drive a car, once one achieves some basic competency in 
the activity, attachment is formed to the feeling of driving, and thus one begins to drive 
aimlessly for the sake of driving. Since for a beginner the goal of learning how to drive 
seems to be simply the ability to perform the act of driving, the more advanced driver 
should understand that learning how to drive is only a means to reach a destination. This 
logic would leave the one who did not, or perhaps could not go past the beginner stage, 
driving around in circles. 
 
The Concept of God in Patañjala Yoga 
 In order to accommodate the concept of God into a strictly dualistic model such as 
that of Classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga, God would have to be either puruṣa or prakṛti, as 
he cannot be both, and he cannot be neither, appearing as a distinct entity or reality, since 
there are no realities that exist outside or above puruṣa and prakṛti. Even if it was said 
that there is a reality that exists above these two, such as is the position of some theistic 
commentators, “in either case the God is irrelevant from the perspective of salvation of 
the individual puruṣa” (Larson 237). Having established that īśvara, existing within the 
constraints of Sāṃkhya-Yoga’s dualistic cosmology, is a puruṣa who has never been 
bound by prakṛti, and that the path Patañjali proposes follows a path of involution 
towards isolation, it becomes evident not only that īśvara is not God, but that the 
existence or not existence of a theistic God is irrelevant in the path of Classical Yoga. 
According to G. M. Coleman, “Patañjali Yoga technique prescinds from whether 
someone admits a God or denies him” (qtd. in Feurstein, The philosophy of Classical 
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Yoga 13). Larson considers the concept of a creator God to be irrelevant in the ontology 
of both Classical Yoga and Classical Sāṃkhya, and relates this to Sartre’s position of 
theism regarding existentialism: “Existentialism is not an atheism in the sense that it 
would wear itself out in trying to demonstrate that God does not exist. It declares rather: 
even if God existed, that would change nothing” (qtd. in Larson 237). Whether īśvara is 
perceived by some as an “inactive deity” (Deussen qtd. in Burley 39), the Supreme 
Creator Brahman (Vijñānabhikṣu), or an experiential reality, since it is not a creator, nor 
sustainer, and has in fact, by definition, no means to function within prakṛti, and thus has 
no role in the liberation of puruṣas, the existence or non-existence of a theistic God is 
utterly irrelevant in Classical Yoga. 
 
Sāṃkhya as Atheistic and Yoga as Theistic 
 Another problem of the translation of the term īśvara as God in Patañjali’s 
Yogasūtra is the common understanding of the main distinction between Classical 
Sāṃkhya and Classical Yoga as the former being atheistic while the latter theistic, labels 
that come to misrepresent both systems. The only determinant leading to this labeling 
appears to be the either presence or absence of the term īśvara, as while the term does not 
appear in the Sāṃkhyakārikā, it does in the Yogasūtra. Hence, in terms of the presence or 
absence of the term īśvara in the two different texts, Yoga has been labeled as saiśvara 
(with īśvara) and Sāṃkhya as nirīśvara (without īśvara). Having established that 
Classical Yoga, following the same ontology as that of Sāṃkhya, adheres to a strict 
dualistic model that could not possibly accommodate a theistic concept of God, their 
saiśvara and nirīśvara classifications should not reflect their respective adherence to or 
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rejection of a believe in God. While there is a difference between the two texts the 
systems which they represent, the nature of their distinction in terms of theism appears to 
be rooted in the mistranslation and misinterpretation of the term īśvara as God. 
 
Conclusion 
 From the present analysis, the term īśvara and its functionality within the 
Yogasūtra, particularly pertaining to the concept of īśvarapraṇidhāna, emerges as the 
representation of an empirical concept and a functional component of the path of Yoga, 
rather than an ontological concept. Its functionality is defined by the experiential nature 
of the system itself, for it does not seek to present a philosophical point of view but rather 
presents a series of techniques to be used in order to achieve a series of experiences 
leading towards the ultimate goal of yoga, kaivalya or isolation in one’s own nature. The 
role of īśvara is therefore akin to the instruction manual Patañjali presents: a series of 
practical tools that facilitate a series of internalizing experiences aimed at the attainment 
of an ultimate goal. Thus, much rather than being or representing God, and thus being the 
determinant for the system of Classical Yoga to be classified as theistic, īśvara represents 
the ultimate ideal of the goal of Yoga: a puruṣa that has never lost its identity to its 
misidentification with prakṛti, and as such, it functions as a practical and experiential 
tool, by being an archetype of this ultimate reality, designed to aid the yogi in its path 
towards liberation.   
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Grammatical Analysis 
 
Key 
m masculine 
n neuter 
f  feminine 
p pronoun 
adj. adjective 
adv.   adverb 
ind. indeclinable 
sing. singular 
dl. dual 
pl. plural 
 
Nominal Cases 
1 subject 
2 direct object 
3 ‘by/with’ 
4 ‘to/for’ 
5 ‘from’ 
6 ‘of/’s’ 
7 ‘in/on/at’ 
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I SAMĀDHIPĀDA 
I.1 atha yogānuśāsanam 
 now the instruction of yoga 
 atha   ‘now‘     ind. 
 yoga         m(a)1sing. 
 anuśāsanam ‘instruction‘    n(a)1sing. 
 
I.2 yogaścittavṛttinorodhaḥ 
 yoga is cessation of the fluctuations of the mind 
 yoga         m(a)1sing. 
 citta-   ‘mind, thought’  
 vṛtti-   ‘turning, moving, existing’ 
 cittavṛtti-   ‘continuous course of thoughts’ 
 norodhaḥ  ‘process of ending‘   m(a)1sing. 
 
I.3 tadādraṣṭu svarupe’vasthānam 
 then the seer remains in its own nature 
 tadā   ‘then‘     ind. 
 draṣṭu    ‘of the seer‘      m(ṛ)6sing. 
 (draṣṭṛ)  ‘looker, one who sees’ 
 sva-   ‘own’ 
 rūpe-   ‘in nature‘     m(a)7sing. 
 avasthānam ‘remaining‘    n(a)1sing. 
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I.4 vṛtti sārūpyamitaratra 
 elsewhere it remains identified with [those] fluctuations 
 vṛtti-  
 sārūpya  ‘similarity, sameness in form’ n(a)1sing. 
 itaratra  ‘elsewhere‘    ind. 
 
I.5 vṛttayaḥ pañcatayyaḥ kliṣtālkiṣṭāḥ 
 fluctuations are five-fold; obstructing and non-obstructing 
 vṛttayaḥ  plural of vṛtti    f(i)1pl. 
 pañcatayyaḥ- ‘five-fold‘     f(ī)1pl. 
 kliṣṭa-   ‘obstructing’ 
 akliṣṭāḥ  ‘non-obstructing‘   f(a)1pl. 
 
I.6 pramāṇaviparyayavikalpanidrāsmṛtayaḥ 
 [fluctuations are] evaluation, misperception, conceptualization, sleep, memory 
 pramāṇa-  ‘evaluation’ 
 viparyaya-  ‘misperception’ 
 vikalpa-  ‘conceptualization’ 
 nidrā-  ‘sleep’ 
 smṛtayaḥ  ‘memory‘     f(i)1pl. 
 
I.7 pratyakṣānumānāgamāḥ pramāṇāni 
 evaluation is direct perception, inference, testimony 
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 pratyakṣa-  ‘direct perception’ 
 anumāna-  ‘inference’ 
 agamāḥ  ‘testimony‘    m(a)1pl. 
 pramāṇāni  ‘evaluation     n(a)1pl. 
 
I.8 viparyayo mithyāñjānamatadrupapratiṣṭham 
 misperception is mistaken knowledge, the foundation of not that form 
 viparyayaḥ  ‘misperception‘    m(a)1sing. 
 mithyā-  ‘mistaken, false‘    
 jñānam  ‘knowledge‘    n(a)1sing. 
 a-tad-  ‘not that‘     ind. 
 rūpa-   ‘appearance, form’ 
 pratiṣṭham  ‘foundation‘    n(a)1sing. 
 
I.12 abhyāsa vairagyābhyām tannirodhaḥ 
 that cessation, is both practice and dispassion 
 abhyāsa-  ‘practice, vigilance of awareness’ 
 vairagya  ‘by non attachment, dispassion’ n(a)3dual  
 tad-   ‘that‘      ind. 
 nirodhaḥ  ‘cessation‘     m(a)1sing. 
 
I.13 tatrasthitau yatno’bhyāsaḥ 
 staying there [in its own nature] is the purpose of practice 
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 tatra-  ‘there‘     ind. 
 sthiti   ‘staying in a particular condition’ f(i)7sing. 
 yatna-  ‘attempt, effort‘    
 abhyāsa  ‘practice‘     m(a)1sing. 
 
I.14 satu dīrgakālanairantaryasatkārāsevito dṛḍhabhūmiḥ 
 moreover, that [practice] has firm ground when cultivated with reverence, 
uninterruptedly, for a long time 
 saḥ-   ‘that‘      m(p)1sing. 
 tu-   ‘moreover‘     ind. 
 dīrga-  ‘long’ 
 kāla-   ‘time’ 
 nairantarya- ‘uninterruptedness’ 
 satkāra-  ‘reverence, consideration, attention’ 
 āsevita  ‘practiced assiduously’   m(a)1sing. 
 dṛḍha-  ‘firm, fixed, steady’ 
 bhūmi  ‘position, ground‘   m(i)1sing. 
 
I.15 dṛṣṭānuśravikaviṣayavitṛṣṇasya vaśīkārasaṃjñāvairāgyam 
dispassion  is the conception of the mastery of being free from desire of that which 
is seen or heard 
 dṛṣṭa-  ‘visible, seen’ 
 ānuśravika- ‘according to hearing’ 
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 viṣaya-  ‘subject matter’ 
 vitṛṣṇasya  ‘(of) free from desire‘   m(a)6sing. 
 vaśīkāra-  ‘subjugating, mastery’ 
 saṃjñā  ‘conception, clear knowledge’ f(ā)1sing. 
 vairāgya  ‘non-attachment, dispassion’  n(a)1sing. 
 
I.16 tat paraṃ puruṣakhyāter guṇavaiṭṛṣṇyam 
 that supreme [vairāgya] is the lack of desire for the constituents of nature, from the 
identification with puruṣa  
 tad-   ‘that‘      ind. 
 para   ‘supreme‘     n(a)1sing. 
 puruṣa- 
 khyāti  ‘(from)  name, title, identification’ f(i)5sing. 
 guṇa-  ‘primary constituents of nature’ 
 vaiṭṛṣṇyam  ‘free from desire‘   n(a)1sing. 
 
I.21 tīvrasaṃvegānāmāsannaḥ 
 of [those with an] intense desire of emancipation, [nirodhaḥ] is near 
 tīvra-   ‘acute, intense‘    adj. 
 saṃvega  ‘desire of emancipation’  m(a)6pl. 
 āsannaḥ  ‘proximity, nearness‘   m(a)1sing. 
 
 
 75
I.22 mṛdumadhyādhimātratvāttato’pi viśeṣaḥ 
 there is also a distinction from weakness, mediumness, intenseness  
 mṛdu-  ‘mild, weak’ 
 madhya-  ‘center, middle’ 
 adhimātratva ‘(from) excessive (ness)‘  n(a)5sing. 
 tataḥ-  ‘from there‘    ind. 
 api-   ‘also‘     ind. 
 viśeṣaḥ  ‘difference, distinction’  m(a)1sing. 
 
I.23 īśvarapraṇidhānadvā 
 or from īśvarapraṇidhāna 
 īśvara-  ‘ideal, ruler, lord, master, supreme soul’ 
  √īśa    ‘to rule over’ 
  -vara  ‘best, preferable’    adj. 
 praṇidhānāt ‘(from) meditation/transference’ m(a)5sing. 
  pra  ‘forward, forth’    adv. 
    ‘like, resembling’   adj. 
  ni  ‘in, into, with’    adv. 
  √dhā  ‘to hold, to maintain, to give’ 
 vā   ‘or‘      ind. 
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I.24 kleśakarmavipākāśayairaparāmṛṣtaḥ puruṣaviśeṣa īśvaraḥ 
īśvara is a special/distinct puruṣa untouched by the accumulations of karma that 
arise from afflictions 
 kleśa-  ‘affliction’ 
 karma-  
 vipāka-  ‘effect, result, ripening’ 
 āśaya  ‘(by/with) receptacle, abode’  m(a)3pl. 
 aparāmṛṣṭa ‘untouched‘    m(a)1sing. 
 puruṣa-   
 viśeṣa  ‘distinction, special (adj.)’  m(a)1sing. 
 īśvaraḥ        m(a)1sing. 
 
I.25 tatra niratiśayam sarvajñabījam 
 there the omniscient seed is unsurpassed 
 tatra   ‘in that case, there, therefore’ ind. 
 niratiśaya  ‘unsurpassed, perfect‘   adj. 
 sarvajña  ‘all-knowing, omniscient’ 
 bīja   ‘seed‘     n(a)1sing. 
 
I.26 pūrveṣamapi guruḥ kālenānavacchedāt 
 also, [he is] the teacher of the ancestors from not being limited by time 
 pūrveṣam  ‘of the ancestors‘   m(a)pron.6sing. 
 pūrva + eṣām  ‘of‘       pron. 
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 api-   ‘even, also‘    ind. 
 guruḥ  ‘teacher‘     m(u)1sing. 
 kāla   ‘(by/with) time‘    m(a)3sing. 
 ānānavacchedāt       m(a)5sing. 
 an ‘non’ + avaccheda ‘limitation‘ (from)   
  
I.27 tasya vācakaḥ praṇavaḥ 
 his sound is oṃ 
 tasya-  ‘his‘      ind. 
 vācaka  ‘word, significant sound’  m(a)1sing. 
 praṇava  ‘syllable oṃ‘    m(a)1sing. 
 
I.28 tajjapastadarthabhāvanam 
 this recitation leads to the essence/meditation of essence/meditation 
 tad   ‘that, this‘     
 japa   ‘repetition of a recitation’  m(a)1sing. 
 tad   ‘that, this‘     m(a)1sing. 
 artha   ‘meaning, purpose, aim’  n(a)1sing. 
 bhāvanā  ‘essence, nature, meditation’  n(a)1sing. 
 
I.29 tataḥ pratyakcetanādhigamo’pyantarāyābhāvaśca 
from there, the attainment of the involution of consciousness and also the 
disappearance of obstacles 
 78
 tataḥ-  ‘from there‘    ind. 
 pratyak-  ‘backwards, in the opposite direction’ 
 cetanā-  ‘consciousness, sense, understanding’ 
 adhigama  ‘mastery, act of attaining’  m(a)1sing. 
 api-   ‘also, even‘    ind. 
 antarāya-  ‘impediment, obstacle’   
 abhāva  ‘absence, annihilation’   m(a)1sing. 
 ca   ‘and‘      ind. 
 
I.32 tat pratiṣedrārthameka tattvābhyāsaḥ 
 the practice of a single reality is for the sake of preventing that [obstacle] 
 tad-   ‘that, this‘     m(a)1sing. 
 pratiṣedha- ‘prevention, warding off’ 
 -artham  ‘for the sake of‘    ind. 
 eka-   ‘one’ 
 tattva-  ‘true/real state, element, reality’  
 abhyāsa  ‘practice‘     m(a)1sing. 
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II SĀDHANAPĀDA 
II.1 tapaḥ svādhyāyeśvarapraṇidhānāni kriyāyogaḥ 
 the tree components of kriyāyoga are tapas, svādhyāya, īśvarapraṇidhāna 
 tapas   ‘heat, austerity, deep concentration’  
 svādhyāya  ‘self study, reciting to one’s self’ 
 īśvarapraṇidhānāni      n(a)1pl. 
 kriya   ‘action, purification, means’ 
 yogaḥ        m(a)1sing. 
 
II.2 samādhibhāvanārthaḥ kleśatanūkaraṇārthaśca 
 the purpose/meaning is the cultivation of samādhi and the attenuation of the 
afflictions 
 samādhi- 
 bhāvanā-  ‘essence, nature, meditation’   
 artha   ‘meaning, purpose, aim’  n(a)1sing. 
 kleśa-  ‘affliction’ 
 tanū-   ‘thin, diminish’ 
 tanūkaraṇa- ‘attenuation, dilution‘   n(a)1sing. 
 karaṇa-  ‘making, effecting’ 
 artha   ‘meaning, purpose, aim’  n(a)1sing. 
 ca   ‘and‘      ind. 
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II.11 dhyānaheyāstadvṛttayaḥ 
 those fluctuations [arising from afflictions (II.3-10)] are abandoned by meditation 
  dhyāna  ‘meditation’ 
 heyāḥ  ‘to be abandoned, gone’  f(ā)1pl. 
 tad-   ‘that‘      ind. 
 vṛttayaḥ  fluctuations    f(i)1pl. 
 
II.18 prakāśakriyāsthitiśīlaṃ bhūtendriyātmakaṃ bhogāpavargārthaṃ dṛśyam 
 the seeable/seen has the character of brightness (sattva), action (rajas), and inertia 
(tamas). it consists of elements and sense organs. [they are] for the sake of 
experience and transcendence.  
 prakāśa-  ‘brightness‘     
 kriyā-  ‘action, purification, means’ 
 sthiti-  ‘inertia’ 
 śīlam   ‘character, tendency‘   n(a)1sing. 
 bhūta-  ‘elements’ 
 indriya-  ‘sense organs’ 
 -ātmakam  ‘consisting of‘    n(a)1sing. suffix 
 bhoga-  ‘experience’ 
 apavarga-  ‘absolution, fulfillment’ 
 artham-  ‘for the sake of‘    ind. 
 dṛśyam  ‘visible object/world‘   n(a)1sing. 
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II.20 draṣṭā dṛśimātraḥ śuddho’pi pratyayānupaśyaḥ 
 the seer [has the quality of] seeing only, although pure, perceiving intellect  
 draṣṭā  ‘seer‘     m(ṛ)1sing. 
 (draṣṭṛ)  ‘looker, one who sees’ 
 dṛśi-   ‘seeing’ 
 mātraḥ  ‘only‘     m(a)1sing. 
 śuddhaḥ-  ‘pure, absolute, simple’  m(a)1sing. 
 api   ‘though’     ind. 
 pratyaya  ‘conception, idea, intellect’   
 anupaśyaḥ  ‘seeing, perceiving‘   m(a)1sing. 
 
II.21 tadartha eva dṛśyasyātmā 
 the existence of the seeable/seen is indeed for the purpose of that [seer] 
 tad-   ‘that‘      ind. 
 arthaḥ  ‘meaning, purpose, aim’  n(a)1sing. 
 eva   ‘only, truly, indeed‘   ind. 
 dṛśyasya-  ‘(of) seeable, seen’   n(a)6sing. 
 ātmā   ‘soul, principle of life, existence’ m(an)1sing. 
 
II.22 kṛtārthaṃ prati naṣṭamapyanaṣṭaṃ tadanyasādhāraṇatvāt 
 with respect to what purpose is accomplished, that [the seen] has vanished, although 
that [the seen] has not vanished due to its universality 
 kṛta-   ‘obtained, accomplished’  adj. 
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 artha   ‘meaning, purpose, aim’  n(a)1sing. 
 prati-  ‘with respect to’ 
 naṣṭam-  ‘vanished, disappeared’  adj. 
 api-   ‘though‘     ind. 
 anaṣṭam-  ‘not vanished, not disappeared’ adj. 
 tat-   ‘that‘      p 
 anya-  ‘other‘     adj. 
 sādhāraṇatvāt ‘(from) universality‘   n(a)5sing. 
 
II.23 svasvāmiśaktyoḥ svarūpopalabdhihetuḥ saṃyogaḥ 
that connection is the cause of the perception of the own nature of the power of both 
the owner [puruṣa] and the owned [prakṛti] 
 sva   ‘property, wealth’    
 svāmi  ‘owner, master’ 
 śaktyoḥ  ‘(of the two/both) śakti’  f(i)6dl. 
 (śakti)  ‘energy, power’   
 svarūpa  ‘own nature’     
 upalabdhi  ‘perception, understanding’   
 hetuḥ   ‘cause, reason’    m(u)1sing. 
 saṃyoga  ‘union, combination, connection’ m(a)1sing. 
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II.25 tadabhāvāt saṃyogābhāvohānaṃ taddṛśeḥ kaivalyam 
 from that destruction [of avidyā (II.24 avidyā is the cause of saṃyoga)] comes the 
destruction of the connection [between puruṣa and prakṛti (II.23)]. that [resulting] 
cessation [at the end of the path] is isolation of seeing (kaivalya). 
 tad-   ‘that’      ind. 
 abhāvāt  ‘(from) annihilation’    m(a)5sing. 
 saṃyoga-  ‘union, combination, connection’  
 abhāvaḥ  ‘annihilation’    m(a)1sing. 
 hānaṃ  ‘cessation, non-existence’  n(a)1sing. 
 tad-   ‘that’      ind. 
 dṛśeḥ   ‘(of) seeing‘    m(i)6sing. 
 kaivalyam  ‘isolation, abstraction‘   n(a)1sing. 
 
II.32 śaucasantoṣatapaḥsvādhyāyeśvarapraṇidhānāni niyamāḥ 
 the niyamas are: śauca, santoṣa, tapas, svādhyāya, īśvarapraṇidhāna 
 śauca-  ‘purity’ 
 santoṣa-  ‘contentment, satisfaction’ 
 tapas-  ‘heat, austerity, deep concentration’ 
 svādhyāya-  ‘self study, reciting to one’s self’ 
 īśvara- 
 praṇidhānāni       n(a)1pl. 
 niyamāḥ  ‘rules, restriction, restraint’  m(a)1pl. 
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II.43 kāyendriyasiddhiraśuddhikṣayāt tapasaḥ 
 tapas is the destruction of impurities, the perfection of the body and sense organs 
 kāya   ‘body‘     m(a)1sing. 
 indriya-  ‘sense organs’ 
 siddhiḥ  ‘perfection, attainment‘  f(i)1sing. 
 aśuddhi  ‘impurity‘     f(i)1sing. 
 kṣayāt  ‘(from) destruction, removal’ n(a)5sing. 
 tapasaḥ  ‘austerity, asceticism, heat’  m(a)1pl. 
 
II.44 svādhyāyādiṣṭahevatāsamprayogaḥ 
 a connection to a chosen deity is from svādhyāya 
 svādhyāyāt  ‘(from) self study/recitation’  m(a)5sing. 
 iṣṭa-   ‘beloved, cherished, respected’  
 devatā-  ‘deity, image of a deity’   
 samprayogaḥ ‘union, conjunction, connection’ m(a)1sing. 
 
II.45 samādhisiddhirīśvarapraṇidhānāt 
 the perfection of samādhi is from īśvarapraṇidhāna 
 samādhi- 
 siddhiḥ-  ‘perfection, attainment’  f(i)1sing. 
 īśvarapraṇidhānāt      n(a)5sing. 
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IV KAIVALYAPĀDA 
IV.34 puruṣarthaśūnyānāṃ guṇānāṃ pratiprasavaḥ kaivalyaṃ svarūpapratiṣṭhā vā 
citiśaktyoreriti 
thus, isolation/abstraction (kaivalya) is the return to the original state of the primary 
constituents of nature, empty of purpose for puruṣa, or the grounding in its own 
nature by the power of awareness/understanding. 
 puruṣa- 
 artha   ‘meaning, purpose, aim’  n(a)1sing. 
 śūnyānāṃ  ‘(of) empty, blank‘   m(a)6sing. 
 guṇānam  ‘(of) primary constituents’  m(a)6sing. 
 pratiprasavaḥ ‘return to the original state’  m(a)1sing. 
 kaivalyam  ‘isolation, abstraction‘   n(a)1sing. 
 svarūpa-  ‘own condition, nature‘   
 pratiṣṭhā  ‘ground, foundation, stability’ f(ā)1sing. 
 vā   ‘or‘      ind. 
 citi-   ‘understanding, awareness’ 
 śakti-   ‘(by/with) energy, power’  f(i)3sing. 
 iti   ‘thus*‘     ind. 
 *in this context, to indicate the end of the text.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The mere presence of the term īśvara in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra has come to affect 
the meaning of both the path and the goal of Classical Yoga as well as the meaning of the 
term Yoga itself. The ambiguity of the term īśvara has greatly contributed to its 
susceptibility to theistic interpretation and concomitant translation as God, for it leads to 
the obscuring of this path of discrimination, separation, involution and isolation towards 
liberation, to a point where it can lend itself to be interpreted and accommodated to fit 
into other ideologies, thus enabling a syncretic trend that has led to the popular 
understanding of Yoga as ‘union with the divine’. In turn, this has become the primary 
determinant to label the system of Classical Yoga as theistic.  The purpose of the present 
study is to shed some light on the subject, not only by analyzing the term within the 
constraints of the Yogasūtra, but also by identifying the several trends throughout the 
development of Hinduism that have contributed to the most prominent hermeneutical 
trends that have led to the obscurity of this subject. 
 The conflicting variety of not only different translations and interpretations but 
different approaches to defining the term īśvara as well as its placement and function 
within the Yoga system have directly contributed to the many misconceptions on the 
subject, since, without much further and deeper investigation, and a full understanding of 
the system as a whole, it can lend itself to people picking and choosing whatever views 
are in agreement with their own. The rich philosophical history of India has propounded a 
myriad of approaches and traditions, however, after the establishment of Classical 
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Hinduism through the categorization of the six Darśanas, subsequent works were 
irrevocably “reconciled with the doctrines of the other of the existing systems, and put 
down as faithful interpretations of the system in the form of commentaries”. Amidst a 
defensive environment in which the different systems constantly tried to elevate their 
own school and lineage over the others, tradition inhibited the development and 
succession of independent thinkers and interpretation (Dasgupta, A History of Indian 
Philosophy 64). Their work depended on previous commentaries, and for one reason or 
another they were unable to look past the shadows casted upon the works they were 
commenting on to be able to provide a fresh perspective rather than perpetuate the 
misinterpretations of their predecessors who were biased by their intent to elevate their 
own belief systems and allegiances. 
 The catalyst for the syncretic trend that plays an essential role in the 
misrepresentation of Patañjali’s path of Yoga is a homogenizing trend that primarily 
arises from a necessity to perpetuate Vedic authority that starts as a reaction against the 
rise of the Upaniṣadic movement. Further, this homogenizing trend is then continued by 
the need to categorize Hinduism into a cohesive system with agreeable components, 
arising from the necessity to organize against the rise of traditions, such as Jainism, but 
particularly Buddhism, that vehemently denied the authority of the Vedas. This gave birth 
to the ambiguous categorization of the āstikas and the nāstikas, the agreers and the 
deniers, which are directly tied to the emergence of the six Darśanas, or ‘orthodox’ 
systems of thought, as the philosophies that constitute Classical Hinduism. This 
homogenizing trend is further strengthened by the desire to elevate Hinduism as a world 
religion as a reaction against the negative depiction of Hindu traditions by Christian 
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missionaries during the British colonialism of India, which, further strengthens Vedic 
authority and ultimately legitimizes Hinduism as a world religion, finally emerging not 
only as a homogenous system but further presented, in many instances, as a monotheistic 
religion, and thus, elevated to the authority of the Abrahamic religions. 
 The classification of Patañjali’s Yoga as a Darśana implies its affiliation into a 
cohesive and unified system of thought, ensuring a false sense of continuity and 
coherence within the development of ‘Hinduism’, advocating an absolutism that has 
reduced a plethora of different practices, philosophies and world-views to a single 
religion. Furthermore, it presents a questionable allegiance to the authority of the Vedas, 
and it defines itself as distinct from those who are not considered āstika, drawing an 
alleged clear demarcation between itself and the nāstikas, when in reality, in many ways, 
“Yoga holds closer affinity with Jainism and Buddhism than with its Vedānta and Bhakti 
cousins” (Chapple, Yoga and the Luminous ix). Furthermore, its frequent paring with the 
system of Classical Sāṃkhya, it allows for īśvara as the main distinction between the two 
systems, labeling the former as saiśvara and the later nīrīśvara, which are often 
translated as theistic and atheistic, terms that come to misrepresent both systems. 
 The syncretic trend that has led to the many discrepancies and misunderstandings 
obscuring the path of Classical Yoga are the product of an indigenous homogenizing 
trend stemming from the perpetuation of Vedic authority that starts as a reaction against 
the rise of the Upaniṣadic movement. This is continued by the need to organize Hinduism 
into a cohesive system of agreeable components standing strong against the rise of 
Buddhism, giving birth to the categorization of āstikas and nāstikas, the emergence of the 
six Darśanas, and ultimately, Classical Hinduism. As a reaction against the negative 
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depiction of Hindu traditions by Christian Missionaries during the British colonialism of 
India, the homogenizing trend is further strengthened as a necessity to elevate Hinduism 
as a world religion. Further, the syncretic trend is not confined to Indian traditions. In 
order to legitimize Hinduism as a world religion in a Christian dominated West, in many 
cases, Hindu traditions have been presented after a process of filtering through foreign 
terms and concepts, which have come to reduce a myriad of rich heterogeneous traditions 
to an easily translatable and adaptable ‘way of life’ that can be ‘attached’ to other 
religions and practices. This leads to the complex system of Yoga to come to be so 
divorced from its roots to such an extent that it can easily be reduced to a mere series of 
calisthenics. 
  The consideration of the popular understanding of the term Yoga as union prompts 
the necessity for clarification in order to determine what is being joined with what. In this 
understanding, the concept of union with the divine would imply, assuming the common 
theistic interpretation of īśvara and thus īśvarapraṇidhāna as devotion to God, that the 
goal of Yoga is to achieve union with īśvara. Therefore, the path Patañjali proposes 
would be centered on puruṣa somehow merging with īśvara, however, Patañjali does not 
speak of merging or uniting with īśvara at all. First of all, he clearly defines Yoga as the 
cessation of the fluctuations of the mind (YS I.2). As these fluctuations are a natural 
involuntary process of the mind, the endeavor towards cessation would imply voluntary 
effort, and thus a determination towards action. In this sense, “Yuj, from meaning to join, 
came, by means of a very old metaphor, to mean to join oneself to something, to harness 
oneself for some work. Thus Yuj assumed the sense of preparing for hard work” (Müller, 
The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy 309), and not necessarily in the sense of physically 
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joining, as the word saṃyoga, for example, denotes. Furthermore, he uses the word 
saṃyoga in negative terms, as it is the bond that keeps puruṣa misidentified with prakṛti. 
It is the dissolution of this bond that leads to the goal of the path (YS II.25).  
 Secondly, Patañjali clearly defines the result of the practice of Yoga as the 
establishment, or rather remaining (avasthānam), of the seer (drṣṭu) in its own nature 
(YSI.3), through a state of samādhi towards the attainment of kaivalya, and the failure of 
that achievement (itaratra), as the identification with the fluctuations that were not 
controlled (YSI.4). The means he prescribes in order to achieve that goal is through 
practice (abhyāsa) and dispassion (vairagya) (YS I.12), further describing different 
techniques in order to adhere to that means. The yogi reaches the goal of standing in its 
own nature through the attainment of kaivalya, which Patañjali defines as the destruction 
of the connection (saṃyoga) between puruṣa and prakṛti, which follows the destruction 
of avidyā, or ignorance, which is the root cause of the cognitive error (YSII.25). 
Therefore, as per Patañjali’s path, it is discrimination or separation, rather than union, 
that leads to the achievement of the goal of Yoga, for Patañjali “did not mean union with 
God, or anything but effort (Udyoga, not Saṃyoga), pulling oneself together, exertion, 
concentration” (Müller, The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy 310).  
 Thirdly, even in the Vedāntic understanding of Brahman, to which many have 
attempted to read theism into as well, there is no such thing as union of the ātman with 
Brahman per se. The misunderstanding that arises in the interpretation of Vedāntic 
doctrine from later devotional practices has led to the understanding that the Self searches 
to merge with Brahman, and hence describes the goal of the system as union with the 
divine. This, however, is not the case, as the Self is not considered to be separate from 
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Brahman, for Brahman and the Self are one and the same. The cognitive error in this case 
is due to the perception that they are separate, thus, the solution, and hence the goal of the 
system is the realization that the separation is an illusion; yet there is no merging or 
union, for they have always been one. In this light, at least in the cases of the Vedānta 
and Classical Yoga, a more accurate translation of the term Yoga would be in the sense 
of harnessing or discipline. 
 A devotional or pseudo-theistic understanding of the term īśvara would define him 
as an outside agent who has the power to actively get involved in the world and grant 
liberation to those who worship him, as some suggest, as is the following example: “It 
appears that the ‘grace’ of the ‘lord’ (īśvara) is also required” (Feuerstein, The Yogasūtra 
of Patañjali 37). The term grace, with a highly Christian connotation due to its use in 
their literature as well as common parlance, is regarded as “the generous saving activity 
of God manifested toward humankind” (O’Meara 3644). This understanding implies an 
agent who is a creator and more importantly sustainer of the universe, which would hence 
exist outside the strict dualistic model of the ontology of Classical Yoga, as well as that 
of Classical Sāṃkhya. Since it has been established that Patañjali makes very clear that 
there are no realities that exist outside or above puruṣa and prakṛti, it would be 
impossible that Patañjali ever had in mind an exoteric understanding of his path as well 
as a devotional role of īśvara, leading to the conclusion that all theistic interpretations of 
Classical Yoga are a complete imposition on the reading of the text. 
 Much rather than God, from the present analysis, the term īśvara and its 
functionality within the Yogasūtra, particularly pertaining to the concept of 
īśvarapraṇidhāna, emerges as the representation of an empirical concept and a functional 
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component of the path of Yoga, rather than an ontological concept. Its functionality is 
defined by the experiential nature of the system itself, for its focus is not exclusively 
philosophical in the sense that it seeks to present a new philosophy in its own right, but 
rather presents a series of techniques to be used in order to achieve a series of experiences 
leading towards the ultimate goal of yoga, kaivalya or isolation in one’s own nature. 
Thus, much rather than being or representing God, and thus being the determinant for the 
system of Classical Yoga to be classified as theistic, īśvara represents the ultimate ideal 
of the goal of Yoga: a puruṣa that has never lost its identity to its misidentification with 
prakṛti, and as such, it functions as a practical and experiential tool, by being an 
archetype of this ultimate reality, providing the yogi with a direct experience of puruṣa, 
where he is able to get a direct glimpse of its true nature. This appears to be the extent of 
the functionality of īśvara in the system, as well as the extent of his role of the guru or 
teacher of the yogi in his path towards liberation.  Hence, the presence of the term īśvara 
in the Yogasūtra serves a utilitarian role by allowing the yogi to be directly engaged with 
the concept of puruṣa in a space of experiential interaction rather than attempting to 
expound on a particular philosophy. 
 Having established that īśvara, existing within the constraints of Sāṃkhya-Yoga’s 
dualistic cosmology, is a puruṣa who has never been bound by prakṛti, and that the path 
Patañjali proposes follows a path of involution towards isolation (kaivalya), it becomes 
evident not only that īśvara is not God, but that the existence or not existence of a theistic 
God is irrelevant in the path of Classical Yoga, for the path of Classical Yoga 
demonstrates to be beyond the classification of both theism and atheism, as it does not 
actively seek to neither prove nor disprove the existence of God. Whether īśvara is 
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perceived by some as an “inactive deity” (Deussen qtd. in Burley 39), the Supreme 
Creator Brahman (Vijñānabhikṣu), or an experiential reality, since it is not a creator, nor 
sustainer, and has in fact, by definition, no means to function within prakṛti, and thus has 
no role in the liberation of puruṣas, the existence or non-existence of God is utterly 
irrelevant in Classical Yoga. 
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